National Review, November 17, 2008

It’s a measure of the predicament in which we find ourselves that merely keeping the banking system going now seems like something of a triumph. It’s even more of a measure that, despite the spending of once-unimaginable amounts of money (or the agreement to spend them), the outcome is still uncertain.

Nevertheless, there have been a few tentative signs that the system may be on the mend. LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate, a key indicator of the interest rates at which banks lend to each other) has been edging down. The TED spread (the difference between three-month LIBOR and the yield on notionally risk-free three-month Treasury bills — a good basis for weighing nervousness in the interbank market) has narrowed. It appears that lending between banks is beginning to revive. It’s a start. Fingers crossed.

None of this is to suggest that a severe recession can be avoided. It cannot. The United States looks set to join many other nations in what may well be the most brutal economic downturn since the 1970s. Saving the banking system, however, will help keep the specter of Joad at bay (a depression, or anything approaching a depression, remains unlikely) and is, obviously, an essential precondition of an eventual recovery, a recovery that would be impossible if the credit markets were allowed to fail. That’s something that market fundamentalists fretting about the “nationalization” of America’s banks need to remember. Risking the ruin of this country’s financial system would have been an absurdly dangerous way to make an ideological point. Yes, part of the genius of capitalism is the “creative destruction” so famously described by Joseph Schumpeter, but sometimes destruction is just destruction.

Watching a Republican Treasury secretary orchestrate the government’s acquisition of significant shareholdings in America’s leading banks has been a disconcerting experience for many of us on the right. Secretary Paulson himself correctly described the whole notion of the government’s taking a stake in private companies as “objectionable.” No less correctly, if a touch belatedly, he recognized that he was left with little alternative. As originally formulated, his TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) was too complex and, in a sense, too indirect to provide the reassurance and support that were needed. Confidence in the banks was collapsing, and without confidence there are no banks, and without banks, well, you get the picture. Only a straightforward injection of new money — and with it, more crucially still, the suggestion that the banks were now effectively underwritten by Uncle Sam, the biggest ATM of them all — would have any chance of halting the slide.

The need to restore confidence lay, I suspect, at the heart of Paulson’s controversial decision not only to offer America’s nine largest banks an infusion totaling $125 billion in taxpayer cash, but also to “force” them to accept it. It’s certainly consistent with the usually reported justification for the Treasury’s bullying: Apparently, the feds didn’t want participation in the program (at least by a major bank) to be seen as a potentially lethal admission of weakness. Maybe, but that argument discounts the comfort that ought to come from government support, and it’s not entirely convincing. It’s more likely the Treasury took the view that in a credit market where pricing had broken down, no bank, however impressive its supposed strength, could be said to be completely safe. In the event of the potential fire sale that, in the days before the announcement of the Paulson purchase, lurked in the future of almost every bank, what would assets really be worth? To ask that question is to answer it. Under the circumstances, preemptively reinforcing the most important players was the right thing to do.

Injecting new capital into the banks is, of course, meant to do more than shore up confidence. By filling some of the craters left in their balance sheets in the wake of the subprime and other fiascos, it is also designed to bolster the banks’ ability to extend credit (put very crudely, banks can lend out only a given multiple of their capital). The Fed has been pumping extra liquidity into the broader system for a while now, but until now this has failed to do much to stimulate lending. The new money has, so to speak, been trapped under the debris of shattered confidence and crumbling financial institutions. The banks were too panicked and too capital-constrained to put this cash properly to work. Direct investment in them by the government is meant to deal with both concerns.

What the banks do with these fresh resources will be a critical test of how Paulson’s program is working. Equally, the response in Washington to the banks’ actions will be an excellent early signal of the extent to which this country’s politicians can be trusted with the power that the bailout has, potentially, now given them. In a way, America’s bankers find themselves in a position resembling that of Eastern Europeans “liberated” by the Red Army in 1944–45: grateful that one evil is being seen off but anxious about what their rescuers might want and, for that matter, how long they plan on staying.

In this respect, Paulson’s comments have been reassuring: “We don’t want to run banks.” And if he’s talking the talk, he’s walking the walk too. The government is buying preferred shares with (basically) no voting rights attached. There is no entitlement to board representation, and after three years the shares can be bought back by the banks that issued them. A dividend that increases sharply after five years gives the banks some (but possibly not enough) incentive to do just that, as do a number of restrictions on compensation, share buybacks, and common-stock dividends. It is true that the government also receives warrants to buy common stock, but giving the taxpayers the opportunity to profit from their investment seems only fair — and may also have been a political necessity. It’s to be hoped that the Treasury will not hang on to any such common stock for too long. Hoped? Yup, I’m afraid that’s the best we can expect.

The Treasury’s scheme thus envisages a relationship that is, as it should be, both at arm’s length and, for the most part, strictly temporary. That’s a far cry from what is popularly understood by “nationalization” and is, of itself, something to watch carefully (and skeptically) but not, necessarily, to dread. Unfortunately, this might not continue to be the case. With the economy tanking, any prudent bank should tighten lending standards; not to do so is asking for trouble. To do so, however, might enrage the politicians who have just approved giving these banks a great deal of public money. The French have already faced this issue head-on, and the banks blinked. Any French bank that accepted a recent infusion of subordinated debt from the French government had to agree to increase its total lending by 3 to 4 percent over a designated twelve-month period. The Brits are stumbling in the same direction. Gordon Brown’s government, which now finds itself owner or part-owner of a quite remarkable collection of banks, has promised to keep its distance from its new charges while simultaneously insisting (to borrow the words of Brown’s chancellor of the exchequer) that “the availability of lending to homeowners and small businesses will be maintained to at least 2007 levels.” Quite what “availability,” a word of vintage New Labour ambiguity, actually means is anyone’s guess.

Similar issues will arise over here. Sen. Chris Dodd, the Connecticut Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, has warned that if the banks are “hoarding [cash] . . . there will be hell to pay.” Meanwhile, New York’s Chuck Schumer and two other Democratic senators have been busy arguing that the Treasury ought to set lending goals based on “previous lending activity,” a recommendation (echoed, incidentally, by the committee’s highest-ranking Republican, Alabama’s Richard Shelby) that shows that they understand little about the economics of banking and even less about the undesirability of political meddling in this area. The lessons of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Community Reinvestment Act have, it seems, yet to be learned.

With the economy facing an alarming deflationary threat, there is a good case to be made for another round of pump-priming by Washington, but any such moves should be arranged directly, openly, and accountably. Messing yet again with the way banks lend is an invitation to repeat the catastrophic errors of recent years, at a time when a fragile financial system has scant room for more disasters. America’s banks need a more unified, more realistic, and smarter regulatory regime, and that’s a proper area for government action, but the allocation of credit should be left to bankers and the market. Given some time, bank lending will again reach the levels that the business cycle dictates it should, and we will then be closer to a healthy, and lasting, recovery.

Whether a new administration is prepared to give banks that time is a completely different, and profoundly worrying, question.