EUbris

National Review, February 18, 2010 (March 8 2010, issue) 

It’s a cliche to use the word “hubris” in an article involving Greece, but when that article is about the single European currency, what else will do? From its very beginning, the euro was a project of monstrous bureaucratic ar­rogance, a classically dirigiste scheme cooked up by an elite confident that it could ignore the laws of economics, the realities of politics, and the lessons of history. While the exact contours of the current crisis could not have been foreseen, the certainty that there would be a crisis could have. To build a monetary union without a political union (or something close to it), or, failing that, an extraor­dinarily high degree of economic con­vergence, was asking for, to use another Greek word, catastrophe.

But that’s what the Eurocrats did. And instead of having the humility to launch their new currency on a relatively small scale in, say, the genuinely converging economies of northwestern Europe — of Germany, say, and the Bene­lux — they redefined convergence. Any EU country that satisfied certain economic tests — the Maastricht criteria — would be eligible to sign up. In the first round (1999), eleven countries did, to be followed later by Greece and four others. The tests were tough, but not entirely unreasonable; yet in applying them as mechanically as they did, the architects of the single currency were in effect arguing that all it took to gauge an economy was something akin to a snapshot. This had the virtue of simplicity, but then so did Five-Year Plans.

Largely uninvestigated suspicions that some of those snapshots may have been photoshopped (there have long been doubts about the quality of the data submitted by Italy and, yes, Greece) were an early warning that the Maastricht criteria, which were also meant to be rules by which countries would continue to play once ensconced within the eurozone, would be enforced less vigorously than first agreed. As it turned out, there was little choice in the matter. The new rules were too rigid for the uncomfortable realities of the ordinary economic cycle, let alone the financial meltdown of the last two years. As things currently stand, they rank somewhere between a promise and a dream. That said, the revelation that Greece may have paid Wall Street’s sav­viest financial engineers to pretty up its national accounts is unlikely to play well in Brussels, except as ammunition for the claim that “speculators” are to blame for the mess in which the eurozone now finds itself.

The real culprits are closer to hand. The most important were those who in­sisted that convergence had been achieved when plainly it had not. The interest rates set by the European Cen­tral Bank were about right for the eurozone’s core, but they were too low for the nations on its periphery. The econ­o­mies of the latter may have had more capacity for growth, but they were also more vulnerable to inflation. One size did not fit all. Bubbles ballooned, then burst. Making matters worse was the damaging effect that the historically unusual combination of in­flation and a strong currency has had on the already shaky competitiveness of these countries’ industries. Nations with high inflation traditionally try to maintain their competitive position by devaluing their currency, but that option was not open to those now yoked to the euro. On some reckonings, Italy, Greece, and the other “Club Med” countries need to de­value by at least 30 percent to return to the competitive positions they held at the end of the 1990s. They need to, but they cannot.

If the hit to private business has been bad, that to the state sector has been worse, albeit to some degree self-inflicted. For countries with weaker public finances, the euro offered both carrot and stick. The carrot was the lower borrowing cost that came from adopting a currency im­plicitly backed by the stronger econo­mies at the eurozone’s core. The stick was the fact that debt could no longer be repaid by the printing press. Un­fortunately, a number of governments, most notably Greece’s, ate the carrot and ignored the stick, but even those that tried to improve or maintain budget­ary discipline found their best efforts swept away in the financial tsunami of 2008–09.

The immediate trigger for the current crisis was panic over the prospect of a Greek default. That’s understandable. Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 125 percent (more than double the notional Maastricht ceiling). The budget deficit is now projected at 12.7 percent (more than four times the Maastricht cap), compared with the mysteriously “low” 6 percent claimed by the outgoing government in October. It may still be understated. Nevertheless, however dysfunctional the Augean Greek state may be (did I mention the endemic tax evasion?), it is not alone in its woes, nor — despite the fact that it accounts for just 2 percent of the EU’s GDP — can it be treated as some inconsequential Balkan outpost.

If Greece defaults, a crisis of confidence in the credit of the eurozone’s other highly indebted nations is inevitable. Even in the unlikely event that default could be confined to Greece, a financial collapse in Athens would bring further devastation to Europe’s already battered banking system, both directly and, as sovereign debt was marked to market across the continent, indirectly. Ger­many’s banks have loaned a total of perhaps 20 percent of Germany’s GDP to Greece, Por­tu­gal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland, and French banks have loaned even more of France’s. “Con­ta­gion” is back. Greek withdrawal from the eurozone is legally possible, but it is no solution. The result would almost certainly be default.

Whatever the legal issues (a direct EU rescue may be illegal under the Union’s law), political complications (hard-pressed Eu­ro­pe­an taxpayers do not relish the thought of paying up for Greece), and risks of a dangerous pre­ce­dent (how will the other debt-struck countries react?), the only feasible short-term solution will be some sort of bailout, ideally involving the IMF (whatever the supposed blow to EU pride) acting in conjunction with the EU or a group of some of its richer member-states. For now, nemesis will not be allowed to follow hubris. The legalities will be dubious, the politics a charade, and the deal last-minute, but that’s EU business as usual. “In­ter­na­tion­al spec­ulators” will be blamed for just about everything. Angela Mer­kel will make the necessary fierce speeches re­fusing to pay and will then pay. The Greeks will agree to the necessary fierce cuts in public spending and will then be paid. Whether these cuts (currently targeted at 4 percent) could, should, or will be made in a climate of collapsing domestic demand will be a decision left for another day.

The euro will endure, somewhat de­bauched (it has already weakened since the Greek panic began), but not all Ger­mans will be upset by that. Germany’s economy is driven by its export sector, and in tough economic times a little devaluation can come in very handy indeed.

Looking farther ahead, the Greek crisis and the fragility of the balance sheets of so many countries within the eurozone suggest that, absent some dramatic re­covery in the global economy, the single currency is reaching a point where muddling along is no longer an option. One alternative might be for Germany and some of the other strong­er countries to quit the euro, leaving it as a currency more suited to the needs of the eurozone’s weaker breth­ren. What’s more likely is that those in charge in Brussels will grab the opportunity presented by this mess to move forward with two items on their long-term agenda. The first will be to push for stricter controls on global finance. The second will be to forge the closer fiscal union without which their monetary union cannot endure. If they succeed in the latter, the European superstate will be even closer to birth.

What was it that someone once said about a crisis being a terrible thing to waste?

Do Mention the War

The Weekly Standard, March 8, 2010

Tolstoy was wrong. Every unhappy family is not unhappy in its own way. Scratch the surface of a foundering relationship, and you’ll often find that money is, if not the sole source of the misery, undeniably the most poisonous. This is certainly true within the “ever closer” family that the European Union is meant to be. Some of the EU’s most savage fights have been about cash, an awkward fact that can equally be read as underlining just how far from familial this most unnatural of unions really is. The different nations of the EU remain, emotionally at least, nations. They continue to be foreign to each other. And who wants to give their money to a bunch of foreigners?

So it shouldn’t be any surprise that Germans are infuriated at the thought of having to stump up for a rescue of Greece’s Augean state. Their own economy is faltering. They have held back labor costs for years. They have, often painfully, maintained budgetary discipline. That’s not the way it’s been in Greece. With Greek government debt at 125 percent of GDP, a budget deficit of 12.7 percent, and distinctly shaky public support for any sort of austerity program, there is little, beyond beaches, about that country to appeal to citizens of the thrifty Bundesrepublik. Opinion polls show that over two-thirds of Germans reject the idea of contributing to a Greek bailout, and the venom with which that opposition is expressed suggests that exasperation has drifted into contempt.

To give more money to the Greeks would be akin to giving schnapps to an alcoholic, argued Frank Schaeffler, deputy finance spokesman for the Free Democrats, the junior partner in Germany’s governing coalition. Focus magazine ran a cover story on “The Fraudster in the Euro-Family” (a reference to the more creative aspects of the Greek government’s accounting) and illustrated it with the Venus de Milo, one-armed and flipping the bird. The tabloid Bild raged at the “proud, cheating, profligate” Greeks. A writer for the rather more heavyweight Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung asked whether Germans should have to retire at 69 rather than 67 to pay for Greek workers striking against proposals to increase their retirement age from 61 to 63. The mood in Germany was not improved by Greece’s deputy prime minister. Stung by all the criticism of his country, he grumbled that, having made off with Greece’s gold during the war, the Germans were in no position to complain “about stealing and not being very specific about economic dealings.”

Germany has long paid the largest share (currently around 20 percent) of the cost of Europe’s trudge towards union. Its annual payments into the EU now exceed what it gets back by over $10 billion. In part this has been viewed as a fair price for Germany’s readmission into polite society. It was also an expression of the once widespread belief—deluded if understandable—among Germany’s political class that an ersatz European patriotism could take the place of the German nationalism that had turned out so unfortunately just a few years before. Over six decades after Hitler perished in his bunker, however, these arguments are running a little thin.

Making matters worse is the debt (in all senses) that the Greek crisis owes to the establishment of the euro, the single currency for which German politicians ignored their voters and junked the deutsche mark in a two-stage process ending in January 2002. The deutsche mark had been one of the great successes of postwar Germany, a symbol of renewed prosperity and bulwark against any return of the hyperinflation that stalks that country’s historical memory. But, to those that counted—i.e., not German voters—the European Union mattered more. The deutsche mark perished, and the economic and budgetary rules—the Maastricht Criteria—designed to preserve the integrity of its successor (and reassure the twitchy German electorate) have not been kept in much better shape.

The new currency proved both an enabler of Greece’s profligacy and an agent of its economic troubles—a double whammy not confined to Greece. From the first, the euro’s interest rates were primarily determined by economic conditions in the eurozone’s core—Germany, the Benelux, and France—which meant that rates were too low for the nations on the periphery. One size did not fit all. The low interest rates fueled inflation, speculative bubbles, and, in some cases, excessive government borrowing in Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, the four “PIGS” in the financial markets’ insulting jargon. (You’re welcome to throw in another I for Italy.) The usual response to disruptions of this nature is devaluation. Signing up for a single currency, however, has removed that option.

Despite German voters’ hopes, this mess cannot safely be confined within the PIIGS’ sties. Drastic austerity programs by the debt-struck might in theory do the trick—although the wisdom of this is debatable at a time of deeply depressed domestic demand—but to succeed they require a degree of consent. Consent, however, is not the message that all those Greek strikes are delivering. So far, Brussels appears to be resting its hopes on the idea that talk of austerity, promises of support, and the prospect of closer economic supervision will be enough to persuade markets to keep funding the PIIGS’ budget deficits. Greece will for now be the sharpest test of that idea, but ultimately the country will not be allowed to fail. Even if it did not destroy confidence in the surviving PIIGS, a Greek collapse would, just as a start, trigger mark-to-market downgrades across the battered balance sheets of Europe’s largest financial institutions. German banks, for instance, have loaned the equivalent of 20 percent of their country’s GDP to the PIIGS, and their French counterparts even more.

Throwing Greece out of the eurozone might be emotionally satisfying (over half of German voters are in favor, though it probably isn’t even legally possible), but inevitably the result, pushing the country into default, would achieve nothing constructive. What would make sense is for Germany and the other countries at the eurozone’s core to abandon the currency. The euro would slump, giving the nations that still use it the devaluation they so badly need. But that’s not going to happen either. The European elites have sunk too much political capital into the single currency to give it up now. They will plough forward regardless of the current crisis. If the logic of that course provides the rationale, or at least an excuse, for the even deeper EU integration that most European voters do not want, then so much the better.

But the opinions of the electorate no longer count for that much anywhere within the EU. With feelings running as they are in her country, Chancellor Angela Merkel has to be seen to be talking tough and doing everything she can to avoid Germany being stuck with the Greeks’ bills. At one level she may mean it, but she knows it is just theater. Merkel will huff and Merkel will puff, but she will not risk bringing down what is left of Athens’s ruins. If a rescue party has to be put together, Germany will be a prominent part of it.

To be fair, it’s not all bad news for Germany. If Greece is indeed bailed out by some or all of its EU partners, the longer-term impact will be both to weaken the euro (which will help Germany’s important export sector) and, by preserving the eurozone as it is, keep many of Germany’s competitors within the eurozone most helpfully hobbled. The combination of higher levels of cost inflation, lower levels of efficiency, and a shared, hard currency has eroded much of the price advantage that was once the main selling point for the industries of Europe’s less-advanced economies. It is estimated that the PIIGS would have to devalue by more than 30 percent to restore their competitive position against Germany, a situation that is only going to get worse.

Like so much to do with Brussels’s strange imperium, this story is a lot less straightforward than it first appears.

Tough Times in EUtopia

The Weekly Standard, March 30, 2009

Sometimes truth just has to speak to powerlessness. Addressing the EU's sham parliament in mid-February, the Czech Republic's refreshingly tactless and refreshingly Thatcherite president, Václav Klaus, raised the awkward topic of what the EU euphemistically refers to as its "democratic deficit" and told MEPs that they were part of this problem, not its solution:

 "Since there is no European demos-and no European nation-this defect cannot be solved by strengthening the role of the European parliament either. This would, on the contrary, make the problem worse and lead to an even greater alienation between the citizens of the European countries and Union institutions."

Klaus's listeners were predictably outraged. They ought to have been terrified. With the EU economies falling apart at an unprecedented pace, there is nothing that these toy-town parliamentarians can do-except get out of the way.

The EU's insultingly undemocratic nature is not news (indeed, it is part of its rationale), but it remains the key to grasping how those who run the EU have, for better and worse, had so much success in ramming their agenda through. Not having to bother too much about national electorates has been a great boon to Brussels. As the continent's economies slide ever deeper into the mire, however, that once handy feature could end up crashing the entire system.

An economic debacle on the current scale is going to shake any political structure, however securely moored, but the EU's persistent recourse to a form of soft authoritarianism has left it peculiarly ill suited to weather the storm to come. After decades of routinely bypassing its voters the union may well no longer have what it takes to secure their approval for the harsh medicine and painful sacrifices necessary to bring the EU through this ordeal in one piece. After all, it can barely even get them to vote: Turnout for the most recent (2004) elections for the EU parliament sank to a record low of 45.5 percent. Admittedly that total was dragged down by massively uninterested Eastern Europeans (only 16.7 percent of Slovaks voted and 20.4 percent of Poles), but it was sparse almost everywhere: Only 39 percent of Brits showed up, about the same percentage as made it to the voting booth in the Netherlands, one of the EU's founding nations.

As the history of the union's occasional, grudgingly granted referenda-a sorry saga of chicanery, rejection and do-overs-reminds us, appeals to the supposed solidarity of that imaginary European demos have never really worked. And that was in the good times. They surely won't do the trick now, nor will arguments based on the logic of a free market ideology widely, if inaccurately, said to have failed. Yet to steer a course through what may become hideously hard times without much in the way of popular consent threatens to push already alienated electorates in the direction of the extremist politics of left or right.

The story of this slump is too familiar to need repeating here, but it is worth pausing to consider how the introduction of the euro has left the EU marooned on a circle of economic hell all of its own making. Imposed on most of the European heartland by a characteristic combination of bullying, bribery, conclave, and legerdemain, the single currency was put in place with as little regard for the real world as for the ballot box. To squeeze a wide range of vastly divergent economies (and to do so with few safety nets) into one monetary system made little sense except when understood as a matter of politics, not economics. But economics has a nasty habit of biting back.

Up until the eruption of the present crisis, the European Central Bank's interest rate policy primarily reflected the needs of France and Germany, Euroland's largest economies. This left rates "too" low for naturally faster growing countries like Ireland and Spain, which in turn inflated unsustainable housing bubbles. These have now burst-in Ireland's case taking much of the banking system down with it. On some forecasts Irish GDP may shrink by 10 percent between 2008 and 2010, a dismal number that could eventually prove too optimistic. Gloomsters joke bleakly that the difference between Ireland and Iceland is six months and one consonant. Spain meanwhile now boasts an official (in other words, understated) unemployment rate of 14 percent. Over 600,000 migrant workers have been laid off. This is not a recipe for social peace.

In other countries, most notably a horribly in-hock Italy (public sector debt over 100 percent of GDP and expanding fast), low interest rates allowed governments to put off long overdue structural reforms. Instead of forcing the introduction of the badly needed discipline that was allegedly one of the principal reasons for its adoption, the euro (a hard currency when compared with shabbier predecessors such as the lira or drachma) was treated as a free pass. It has been anything but. Even before the current mess, Italy's crucial export sector was finding it difficult to cope with the brutal combination of rising cost inflation and a currency far stronger than the accommodating, and periodically devalued, lira. On some estimates, this latest recession is the fourth that Italy has suffered in the last seven years. Back in 2005 Silvio Berlusconi described the euro as a "disaster" for his country. He was not exaggerating.

Devaluations are to GDP what steroids are to sport. In the long-term they may be unhealthy, but in the short-term they frequently work miracles. The problem is that the option is no longer so easily available for the nations that adopted the euro. Italy, Ireland, and a number of other countries are in the grip of a one-sized currency that could never fit all, and the euro is now for them little more than a straitjacket or, more accurately, a noose. They have theoretically retained enough sovereignty to quit the euro, but for one of them to do so, especially if other states stick with the common currency, would be to risk something close to complete economic meltdown.

Money would pour out (so much so that capital controls would probably be required), interest rates would soar, and the reborn national currency would plummet. In the absence of a bailout from the eurozone it had just abandoned, the exiting country itself would probably be driven to renege (either de facto or de jure) on its foreign debt-as would much of its private business. In its consequences, this could be a Lehman-plus trauma with possibly devastating effects on already chaotic international capital markets. No less critically, it could set off a crisis in confidence in the credit of those weaker nations that had kept faith with the single currency, not to speak of feebler economies elsewhere. The cure, therefore, could well be worse than the disease.

In the meantime, in a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't spasm, the markets are fretting that the disease is turning ever more dangerous-and, in a process that feeds upon itself, ever more infectious. Spreads on sovereign debt yields within the eurozone (between German Bunds, say, and paper issued by Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland) have widened noticeably. This is a warning that investors are beginning to think a once unthinkable thought: that one or more of the zone's less resilient members might go into default. On this logic these countries can neither afford to keep the euro nor to junk it. Rock, meet hard place.

These worries are made even more pressing by concern over the impact of Eastern Europe's spiraling economic woes on the already shattered finances of the western half of the continent. Contrary to some of the more excitable headlines, not all the countries of formerly Warsaw Pact Europe are, yet, in deep trouble, but the problems of those that are (notably Hungary, Ukraine, Romania, and Latvia) threaten to wreck confidence in those that are not. And those problems will not be confined safely behind the Oder-Neisse line: Two of Sweden's largest banks, for instance, are frighteningly overexposed to the faltering Baltic States, while their counterparts in Austria, seemingly lost in nostalgic Habsburg reverie, have reportedly lent out the equivalent of 70 percent of their country's GDP to once Kaiserlich und Königlich territories and parts nearby.

Eastern Europe's problems are Western Europe's and, given Eastern Europe's dependence on Western capital flows, vice versa, a state of affairs that neither side appreciates. Infuriated by the impression that they were being sidelined by the upcoming "G-20+" summit in London, nine of the EU's former Soviet bloc members held their own breakaway meeting earlier this month to discuss what to do. Meanwhile, led by Germany's indignant Angela Merkel in full prudent-Hausfrau, Thatcher-handbag mode, the Westerners have tried to damp down the East's increasingly aggressive demands for assistance. Good luck with that. Demonstrating a keenly cynical awareness of which buttons to press, the Hungarian prime minister warned that a severe slowdown in the East could lead to "a flood of unemployed immigrants traveling to Western Europe in search of jobs."

If you suspect that all this leaves the EU looking somewhat stuck, you would be right. But then this is no accident. The lack of democratic responsiveness so thoroughly ingrained into the union's architecture was always intended to stop the bloc's politicians from succumbing to the temptations of protectionism, beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations, and other questionable devices often found in the toolbox of an economically desperate national government. That's all very well, and all very praiseworthy, but it doesn't do anything about the desperation, a desperation that will be felt all the more sharply by electorates looking for their leaders to do something, anything, in response to this crunch-only to discover to their chagrin (to use too gentle a word) that there is little that the EU will, legally or politically, allow those leaders to do.

To take just one example, earlier this year Britain saw a series of wildcat strikes protesting the importation of cheap foreign workers from elsewhere in the union as a means of undercutting the locals. The facts that triggered the dispute are murky, but what is certain is that even if the British government had wanted to intervene under EU law it could not. Equally, while the opposition Tories grumbled, nobody was fooled. If the Conservatives had been in charge, they would have done just the same as Labour: nothing. If you want to drive voters to the political extremes, stories like this are a good place to start.

Except that "start" is the wrong word. Parties of the extreme, whether of left or right, already have more than a foothold in Germany and France. "Populists" of every description can be found in the legislatures in countries from Belgium to Denmark to Latvia to Austria to Poland to Hungary. Take your pick: There are plenty to choose from. Even in never-so-sedate-as-it-seems Britain, a country that has made a fetish (if not always convincingly) of its moderation, the much-reviled far rightists of the hitherto tiny British National party are showing some signs of evolving from being useful bogeymen for the left into a party with demonstrable political clout within elements of a white working class that has been neglected for too long.

The backgrounds and the prospects of these movements vary widely from country to country, as do the pasts and the resentments that have shaped them, but in recent years their appeal has begun to grow in sections of the electorate pummeled by the dislocations brought about by mass immigration and globalization-dislocations made all the more painful by the realization that the ruling elites who never really asked them for their opinion on these changes, let alone their agreement to them, couldn't give a damn about their plight. This is a perception that will only be sharpened when the populations of these countries, more and more of whom are losing their jobs, are told by that very same political class that protection is off the agenda and that austerity is on, that saving local industries is unacceptable, and that helping out foreign countries is a must. And, oh yes, none of this was our fault-it was all the bankers' doing-and, oh yes, they and their bonuses have got to be rescued too.

So what's next? The leaders of the EU countries will do their best to muddle through in rickety, unpopular unity. Here and there they will cheat both on each other and on the key EU principle of a single market. The warning signs are already there. In February, President Sarkozy attacked the way that French auto companies were supplying their home market from manufacturing facilities in the Czech Republic. The previous month, Britain's Gordon Brown had criticized the amount of overseas lending by the UK's beleaguered bailed-out banks. Nevertheless, however awkwardly, however reluctantly, the EU's members will attempt to hang together-for as long as (or indeed longer than) their domestic politics comfortably permit, an effort that will inevitably further boost the appeal of the wild men of the fringes.

That said, as the EU's leaders are all too well aware, the slump has so far brought down two European governments (in Latvia and non-EU Iceland). Nobody wants to be next, let alone run the risk of political and economic breakdown. The few remaining traces of the budgetary discipline that supposedly still underpins the euro will therefore probably be scrapped. The euro may hang on to its reach, but only at the cost of its integrity. To ordinary Germans this will be seen as a betrayal, a Dolchstoss even. A people haunted by memories of where a debauched currency can lead, they only agreed to part with their much-cherished deutsche mark on the understanding that the euro would be run with Bundesbank-style discipline. That was then.

So money will be thrown around, the imperiled brethren of both East and West will, after much shoving, screaming, and hesitation, be bailed out. Some protectionist measures (directed against those outside the EU) will be brought in and all fingers will be crossed. It won't be pretty, but with luck, it might be enough to stave off catastrophe. Pushing their luck, some glass-is-half-full Europhiles believe that the fact that no country can easily work its way through these tribulations alone will conclusively make the case for still closer European integration to some of the EU's more reluctant federalists. You can be sure that this is a rationalization that Brussels will look to exploit: Rahm Emanuel is not the only politician unwilling to waste a crisis. The EU's policy response to the slump is likely to have two objectives: the reconstruction of member-states' economies and the destruction of what's left of their autonomy. Going for the latter could well drive even more disaffected voters into the extremist fringe, though Brussels is arrogant enough to persist. There are already indications that the eurocrats may be pushing at an open door. In a startling example of mistaking the Titanic for the lifeboat, Poland has become just one of several nations speeding up plans to sign up for the euro-and the safe haven it is meant to represent.

On the other hand if, as appears disturbingly likely, the economic situation grows far darker, it's easy to draw an alternative picture in which both euro and union come under previously unimaginable stress, stress with unpredictable and potentially ominous consequences, stress that will be echoed and intensified by mounting political and social disorder in a Europe that discovers, too late, that there was something to be said for democracy after all.