Money Manager

Ben Bernanke: The Courage to Act  - A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath

The Weekly Standard, February 5, 2016

Georgetown, Washington DC, November 2008 © Andrew Stuttaford

In The Courage to Act, former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke reveals, a little unexpectedly, that he can tell a taut tale well, and in a manner accessible to someone who wouldn’t know a CDO from an Alt-A mortgage. After a likable autobiographical beginning, the book is centered on the Fed's response to the financial crisis that started to unfold just over a year after Bernanke took office in 2006. Bernanke was right to see that catastrophe threatened to engulf more than Wall Street, and he was right to see that, in the much-mocked phrase, something had to be done.

It's easy to criticize the technical aspects of bailouts based on Depression-era powers usable in "unusual and exigent circumstances" and put together with "chewing gum and baling wire." But that misses the point. Financial panics feed on themselves. What mattered about the rescue packages was not their structure but what they symbolized: Money, a lot of money, was available, and the mechanisms were in place to dole it out. With confidence gone and liquidity evaporating, that was what markets needed to know.

Neither left nor right nor center rejoiced in what was widely characterized as a helping hand for the rich, but there were more explicitly ideological objections to the bailouts, too, most notably from congressional Republicans. They ranged from the nutty—TARP as "Bolshevism," a label that would have surprised Lenin—to a more intellectually coherent insistence on greater respect for the disciplines of laissez faire.

But to argue against the interventionism of 2008-09 on the grounds that markets are best left to sort themselves out was (as the ebbing Bush administration also appreciated) to succumb to a form of fundamentalism with no connection to political reality. From Greece to Spain to France to Italy, economic stagnation, or worse, has shaken the European Union's political order to a degree largely unimaginable a decade or so ago. And not in a way that bodes well for free enterprise.

Over here, the maelstrom on Wall Street did its bit to propel Barack Obama into the White House. The feebleness of the economic recovery that followed has played its part in the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. To maintain that America's political center would have held in the event of a collapse in the banking system—empty ATMs and all the rest—is absurd.

As it was, the mayhem triggered by the implosion of Lehman Brothers offered a taste of a larger calamity dodged. Bernanke would have preferred to help out Lehman, too—both the Fed and an essentially helpless Treasury understood that its failure would be an "epic disaster." But the law, he writes, stood in the way: Lehman Brothers was in such bad shape that it wasn't eligible for the emergency financing deployed elsewhere. It's been suggested that this was merely a convenient excuse. Bernanke himself admits that the Fed was reaching the limits of the politically and financially feasible. Market conditions were such that any assessment of Lehman's underlying strength (and eligibility for aid) was more art than science, leaving some wiggle room had the Fed been prepared to take it.

Nevertheless, I'm inclined to believe Bernanke's insistence—his version of events, unsurprisingly, is more or less in line with what Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson have to say in their memoirs—that the law counted. In an age of technocratic excess, that's cause for mild patriotic celebration. In marked contrast to the lawlessness that scarred the defense of the eurozone, the Americans stuck by the rules.

But any celebration is tempered by the knowledge that the Fed's emergency powers have been rewritten in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act to exclude lending to specific institutions ("broad-based" lending is still permitted), a right Bernanke claims to have been "happy to lose." This change was cheered on by the likes of Elizabeth Warren; the Republican chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, fretting about moral hazard, thought that it did not go far enough. As it is, this restriction will almost certainly make it impossible for the Fed to give the sort of support it gave to smooth J. P. Morgan's takeover of Bear Stearns, let alone to AIG. And that'll be fine—until it's not.

When it comes to moral hazard, Bernanke notes that "no firm would willingly seek Bear's fate." It wasn't insouciance over risk that brought so much ruin, but the failure to understand it.

Drawing the correct line between the necessary independence of the Fed and necessary democratic accountability is (as Bernanke clearly appreciated) not straightforward, particularly during a financial rescue operation when the maintenance of market confidence—and thus, often, secrecy—is of the essence. A couple of years after the bailouts, it emerged that the emergency financing extended to Wall Street's finest was much larger than realized. Congress would not have taken the news well had it known this at the time.

Given the seriousness of the situation—and the fact that the Federal Reserve had to do most of the heavy lifting—Bernanke likely found an acceptable balance between the needs of finance and the demands of Capitol Hill. But occasionally some of his comments ("even the risk of a once-in-a-century economic and financial catastrophe wasn't enough for many members of Congress to rise above ideology and short-run political concerns") betray the impatience of the technocrat with democracy's rougher edges.

There are hints, too, of technocratic bias in Bernanke's analysis of the causes of the crisis. He's unwilling to let interest rate policy take much of the blame and, to be fair, he makes a decent case why it shouldn't. He does admit that the Fed was slow to notice the problems that were developing and slow to fully grasp their significance. He acknowledges that a ludicrously fragmented regulatory system had failed to keep up with rapidly evolving capital markets. But in the end, private sector culprits—including subprime lunacy, the bewilderingly intricate interconnectedness of the modern financial system, and good old-fashioned panic—dominate his perp walk.

Hyman Minsky, the economist who, decades ago, warned that a prolonged period of financial stability could lead to dangerous investor complacency, gets the shout-out he deserves. But did the widespread perception—boosted by heavy, if misdirected, regulation—that markets were well regulated reinforce that overconfidence? There is also the inconvenient fact that capital adequacy rules strongly encouraged banks to favor mortgage lending and, critically, the purchase of mortgage-backed securities—so long as the latter were rated Triple A by the rating agencies that were, themselves, given a privileged position by regulators.

Triple A! What could go wrong?

Bernanke also has little to say on the way that postcrisis regulation has hit the willingness of banks to lend. That's ironic, given his belief that shrunken credit flows made the Great Depression worse; doubly so, as reining in the banks has probably canceled out no small part of the boost that the ultra-low interest rates generated by quantitative easing (QE) were meant to bring.

Bernanke recalls that after QE1 and QE2, he had concluded that the Fed's securities purchases had been "effective" but "not enough, on their own, to achieve an adequate pace of economic growth and job creation." QE3 came next. That began to taper off toward the end of his tenure, by which time Bernanke believed that the economy was in considerably healthier shape.

It was impossible, he concedes, to know how much of the recovery was due to the Fed's work, but Bernanke is convinced that "unconventional monetary policies" promoted growth and reduced the risk of deflation. That could be true. But there may eventually be a harsh price to pay for choosing to put the laws of economics to one side for so long. Years in which interest rates—the cost of money—have been so disconnected from market forces have left a trail of mispriced investment and unwise borrowing that is likely to end up in a nasty bust. What will an already overstretched Fed be able to do then?

Bernanke was not given the benefit of the doubt that Alan Greenspan—the "Maestro"—enjoyed. Tough times will do that. His immediate response to the crisis infuriated many. The measures he took in the years that followed were greeted with another round of jeers by many and crossed fingers by more. Even those who profited from the stock market recovery built on his cheap money seemed suspicious of their friend at the Fed.

Only a few brave contrarians have called Ben Bernanke a maestro. His historical reputation will probably be all the better for that. By detailing what he did and why he did it, this book won't hurt it, either. In the end, the consequences of his grand gamble will count for more. And we still don't really know what those will be.