Measuring Man

Charles Murray: Human Accomplishment

American Outlook, December 1, 2004

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Did Charles Murray have a difficult time in high school? Judging by what he writes, when he writes, and how he writes, he’s someone who would not have enjoyed the conformist, unimaginative world of contemporary American secondary education. A controversialist who never knows when to stop, a math geek who understands what counts, Murray was probably jostled in the school yard, pushed about in the cafeteria, and, in that hallmark of intellectual independence, repeatedly hauled up in front of the principal. “Murray, don’t ever, ever argue with your teachers again.”

His best-known work, 1994’s The Bell Curve (co-written with Richard J. Herrnstein), triggered a spasm of denunciation, condemnation, and self-righteous indignation that an earlier heretic, the luckless Galileo, would have found all too familiar. It’s not necessary to agree with Murray and Herrnstein’s thesis to be struck by the nature of the criticism it generated, a carnival of vituperation where the language used, replete with keening cries of anathema and frenzied declarations of conformist piety, was more reminiscent of the deliberations of the Inquisition than any attempt at scientific discourse. The message? Suggestions that intelligence is an inherited characteristic are perilous and, if in any way associated with “race,” positively lethal.

So what, nine years later, has Murray gone and done? Indefatigable, delightfully tactless, and armored only with a thick cladding of protective statistics, America’s heretic has volunteered once more for the stake, this time as the author of a book that in essence argues that a wildly disproportionate part of mankind’s intellectual and cultural patrimony is the work of those reviled monsters, the “dead white males.” Will the man never learn?

Praising dead white males is bad enough, of course, but even if we put that grave offense to one side, it’s a sad reflection of the current intellectual climate to see that Murray’s belief in the possibility of making objective assessments of human achievement will likely be condemned as lunacy, and, worse still, as unacceptably—and archaically—“judgmental.” Seared by the inquisitorial fire last time, Murray tries to anticipate these objections with statistical method; taken in aggregate, he argues, the data cannot lie. It may be reasonable to disagree with the relative rankings of, to pick two of his greats, Michelangelo and Picasso, but not with the overall conclusion: “Now is a good time to stand back in admiration. What the human species is today it owes in astonishing degree to what was accomplished in just half a dozen centuries by the peoples of one small portion of the northwestern Eurasian land mass.”

But before any living white males are tempted to reach for brown shirts and chilled champagne, it’s important to recognize that Human Accomplishment is far from being a piece of ethnic cheerleading, nor is it any cause for Old World complacency. Always reliably gloomy, Murray warns, “it appears that Europe’s run is over. In another few hundred years, books will probably be exploring the reasons why some completely different part of the world became the locus of great human accomplishment.”

Murray’s method of reaching these conclusions is intriguing. To start with, he confines his examination of “accomplishment” to the sciences and the arts (some of them anyway; omissions include, dismayingly, architecture). That’s a little too narrow, in my judgment. There’s no room for the military, for example. In defense of that omission, Murray maintains that “putting ‘Defeated Hitler’ on the human résumé is too much like putting ‘beat my drug habit’ on a personal one,” but excluding the warriors and the warlords shuts out a Churchill or a Caesar, individuals who certainly ought to be found on any roll call of human genius. Governance and commerce are also eliminated. “Those achievements,” Murray avers, “are akin to paying the rent and putting food on the table, freeing Homo Sapiens to reach the heights within reach of the human mind and spirit—heights that are most visibly attained in the arts and sciences.”

There’s more than a touch of the ivory tower about Murray’s decision to restrict his investigation in this way, but it fits nicely with the aspirational message of Human Accomplishment: the arts and the sciences matter. More cynical folk will note that these areas of activity also lend themselves better than most to Murray’s approach. He writes,

After reviewing histories and chronologies of [commerce and governance], my judgment was that while it was possible to compile inventories of people and events, the compilations were unlikely to have either the face validity or the statistical reliability of the inventories for the arts and sciences. The process whereby commerce and governance have developed is too dissimilar from the process in the arts and sciences.

That’s true enough, and, more importantly, Murray’s relatively narrow focus doesn’t necessarily detract from the case he is trying to build. After all, success in the arts and sciences are not only worthy aims in themselves: taken together, they represent an excellent proxy for the achievements of a particular society at a particular time.

Good proxy or not, it’s still jarring to read about “the statistical reliability of the inventories for the arts.” “Statistical reliability” is bean-counter speak, hardly the lofty language usually associated with an early Picasso or the glories of a Turner sunset. This helps explain why some readers’ initial reaction to the methodology at the heart of Human Accomplishment will lie somewhere between incredulity, astonishment, and laughter. Mind you, Murray’s methodology is unusual enough to raise an eyebrow or two regardless of any aesthetic considerations. Basically (and this is a gross oversimplification), what he has done is count the footnotes. He has gone through a large number of reference books dedicated to the history of the arts and the sciences, and kept a tally of references to a particular individual or event. After subjecting the data to various statistical adjustments, those accomplishments that feature in the most references are, he asserts, likely to represent the pinnacles of man’s achievement. In “recounting . . . accomplishment in the arts, sciences, and philosophy for the last 2,800 years,” there are, concludes Murray, 3,869 people “without whom the story is incomplete.”

And not 3,870? At first sight this technique appears absurd, little more than the mathematics of the lunatic asylum, but statistics is nothing if not a patient discipline, and Murray carefully explains his logic. As an example, he demonstrates how it works when applied to Western art. He begins with “a staple of undergraduate art courses, Art Through The Ages.” In its sixth edition, “Michelangelo has the highest total of page references and examples of works devoted to him, more than twice the number devoted to either Picasso or Donatello, tied for number two. Then comes a tie among Giotto, Delacroix, and Bernini, followed by a tie among Leonardo, Rembrandt, and Dürer, and then still another tie between van Eyck and Raphael. . . . ”

He then turns to another standard text, H. W. Janson’s History of Art. Many of the names overlap, but Delacroix (somewhat surprisingly highly rated in Art Through The Ages) doesn’t make the top eleven, whereas Titian and Masaccio do. Repeat this exercise enough times with enough sensibly chosen reference books, and the list is likely to end up dominated by the same names again and again, a list, Murray argues, that is a fair measure of artistic greatness. The high correlations are “a natural consequence of the attempt by knowledgeable critics . . . to give the most attention to the most important people. Because different critics are tapping into a common understanding of importance in their field, they make similar choices. Various factors go into the estimate of importance, but they are in turn substantially associated with excellence.”

Of course, there are many potential problems with this method, but although I am no statistician and Human Accomplishment is (casual readers beware) a math-heavy tome, it is impossible not to be impressed by the steps its author has taken to deal with some of the more obvious objections, particularly those involving cultural, geographical, ethnic, and gender bias, let alone the dread offense (and worse word) of epochcentrism. If, at times, the results make uncomfortable reading for the politically correct, those people should not look for much consolation from Murray: “it is important,” he warns, “not to conflate aspirations with history.”

This is not to say that Murray would claim that his method is perfect. His decision to create separate categories for what he sees as the great literary traditions (Arabic, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and “Western”) is proof enough of that. How does one compare Shakespeare with Basho, or Kalidasa with Du Fu? And then there are those ancient feats of scientific discovery (fire, say, or the wheel) that underpin our society more than any microchip—who gets the credit for those? Murray sidesteps some tricky questions of attribution by beginning his survey at a comparatively late date in human history (and 800 B.C. is a comparatively late date), but even this maneuver doesn’t address those more recent human achievements that are now vanished from memory. If the Iliad hadn’t survived, for example, it would not have been included in Murray’s database, but would it have been any less of an accomplishment? In all likelihood, not enough such works have been lost, or discoveries forgotten, to invalidate Murray’s argument, but it is difficult not to think of these and other such issues when trying to weigh the wisdom of what he is trying to say.

These problems do not, however, undermine the core of his case: the central and defining role of Europe (and its American extension), particularly over the last half-millennium, as the pacesetter of human accomplishment. This ought to be a statement of the obvious. In much the same way as the small plaque in London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral dedicated to its architect simply states, “si monumentum requiris, circumspice,” so it is with Europe’s contribution to civilization. Just look around you.

Sadly, however, we live in an age when such commonsense observations can set off a scandal. Murray laments how

the idea of the Noble Savage . . . has reemerged in our own time. It has become fashionable to decry modern technology. Multiculturalism, as that word is now understood, urges us to accept all cultures as equally praiseworthy. Who is to say that the achievements of Europe, China, India, Japan, or Arabia, are “better” than those of Polynesia, Africa or the Amazon? Embedded in this mindset is hostility to the idea that discriminating judgments are appropriate in assessing art and literature, or that hierarchies of value exist—hostility as well to the idea that objective truth exists.

Of course, there’s no denying that, with all its lists and scatter diagrams, there is a hint of madness in the method that Murray uses to inventory “our species at its best.” Nevertheless, fans of insanity will discover far more to delight them in the posturing of today’s intellectual establishment, with its poisonous mix of self-loathing, political correctness, and frivolity, than in anything to be found in Human Accomplishment.

That said, there’s a danger that Murray’s readers may be left asking themselves exactly what his 668 pages are for. As a miscellany of intriguing information and quirkily intelligent observations, the book is a delight. To take two examples, both the charming description of the twelfth-century Chinese city of Hangzhou and the concept of a “meta-invention” (by which he means “the introduction of a new cognitive tool [such as logic] for dealing with the world around us”) are worth the price of admission alone; but, by themselves, they are commentary, not a theme.

More useful, perhaps, is to see Murray’s ratings of excellence as a valuable antidote to the ethos of an age deeply prejudiced against the notion of genuine achievement. As Murray reminds us, “excellence is not simply a matter of opinion, though judgment enters into its identification. Excellence has attributes that can be identified, evaluated, and compared across works.” Indeed it does. But if Murray is not just to be the highbrow equivalent of the record-store nerds in novelist Nick Hornby’s High Fidelity (“We’re messing around at work, the three of us, getting ready to go home and rubbishing each other’s five best side-one track-ones of all time”), there has to be more to Human Accomplishment than an accumulation of lists, applause, and fascinating facts.

So, is it the shocking science of IQ, genes, gender, and race? Is Human Accomplishment’s tale of dead white male success merely a return to some of the Bell Curve’s most controversial contentions? Somewhat cagily, Murray notes that “almost all of the current evidence regarding the causes of group differences is circumstantial and inconclusive. The debate will not have to depend on circumstantial evidence much longer, however. Within a few decades, we will know a great deal about the genetic differences between groups. Not all of the controversy will go away, but the room for argument will narrow substantially.”

Cagey, perhaps, but fair enough. That said, Murray’s conclusion that “it therefore seems pointless to use historical patterns of accomplishment to try to anticipate what these genetic findings will be” is disingenuous. Although he writes, correctly, that “biological and environmental explanations [for different rates of achievement among different ethnic groups or between the sexes] can both play a role, separately or interacting in such complex ways that the line between the roles of biology and environment blurs,” it is clear that he sees biology as highly important in the equation. His discussion of the extraordinary success of Ashkenazi Jews, for example, leaves little room for doubt that he believes that a good deal of the credit is due to their genes.

And if that could be true for the Ashkenazim, why not for other ethnic or racial groups? It is no surprise, then, to discover that the book contains a favorable reference or two to Francis Dalton, one of the most famous (or infamous, depending on your view) of the Darwinian danger men. Yes, of course Murray is entitled, and right, to insert the (handily diplomatic) disclaimer that it is still impossible to come to a precise assessment of the relative contributions of nature and nurture to individual and group differences, but that disclaimer comes at a high price. If he is suggesting that we may be on the verge of scientific discoveries that could transform our understanding of the sources of human accomplishment, logically this must substantially dilute the importance of much of what he is trying to say about that topic now.

That, doubtless, would be a disappointment to Murray. He has more than a touch of the teacher about him, and much of Human Accomplishment is best seen as an instruction manual for our species. It is this, I suppose, that the book is for. Murray being Murray, the controversialist extraordinaire, his advice makes uncomfortable reading for the vapidly sentimental. Money, he explains, makes the world go round—faster. Too much consensus or too much family can hold back achievement. War, amusingly, need not. Despite a somewhat shaky grasp of history and horology, The Third Man’s Harry Lime understood this perfectly: “In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed. But they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love, and they had five hundred years of democracy and peace. And what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.” Needless to say, democracy fares no better with Murray than with Lime. The record so far (distorted, admittedly, by the fact that democracies were very rare until recently) shows that a political structure permitting individual autonomy has been more valuable than the mere existence of universal suffrage. In this conclusion, Murray is clearly correct.

To Murray, it is, above all, the extent to which individuals use that autonomy to realize their potential that makes accomplishment possible. One of the most refreshing aspects of this book is the critical importance attached to the individual: “one may acknowledge the undoubted role of the cultural context in fostering or inhibiting great art, but still recall that it is not enough that the environment be favorable. Somebody must actually do the deed.” Doing the deed (in the sciences just as much as the arts) and, in the case of the most talented of all, having a shot at joining Murray’s blessed 3,869, involves extraordinary amounts of work (some of that “perspiration” that Thomas Edison was always talking about) and a degree of commitment that can often tip over into monomania. Murray argues that this takes not only talent but also a sense of some higher purpose. This is likely to be grounded in religion (Murray argues, for example, that post-medieval Christianity offered Europe particular competitive advantages). Even if it is not, however, such a sense of purpose will be impossible to reconcile with the “ennui, anomie, [and] alienation” that, Murray suggests, account for the twentieth-century artistic and cultural decay and are, quite clearly, the villains of his fascinating and stimulating book.

It is a beguiling argument, to be sure, but to return tactlessly to an earlier topic, will the issue that Murray has so elegantly tried to dodge reduce what he has to say to irrelevance? The notion that an individual’s future is irrevocably determined, in a Calvinism of the genes, by his or her biological make-up will probably always be the crudest of caricatures, but caricatures can be surprisingly persuasive. After all, Murray tells us,

after Freud [and] Nietzsche . . . it became fashionable . . . to see humans as unwittingly acting out neuroses and subconscious drives. God was mostly dead. Morality became relative. These and allied beliefs substantially undermined the belief of creative elites that their lives had purpose or that their talents could be efficacious.

That is probably quite true, but our increasing understanding of genetic science may mean that a far greater philosophical challenge is lurking just over the horizon. As Murray has said, “all we need is a few decades’ patience.”

Hang onto your hats.

Basic Instinct

American Outlook, September 1, 2002

Joseph Epstein: Snobbery - The American Version

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The Englishman said to me, “oh you are writing for an American magazine.” The eyebrow arched, the lip curled, the cliché was confirmed over a smugly sipped cup of tea. English snobbery, again. To the rest of the world, it is our defining vice (full disclosure: I’m also from the scepter’d isle), something as English as military defeat is French. Fair enough: mine is a country obsessed by class. Only in England could a humorous essay (published in the 1950s by one of the Mitfords, naturally) on the distinctions between the language (“U”) of the upper classes and that spoken by everyone else (“Non-U”) become a national obsession. Lavatory was “U,” toilet was (and, some would say, still is) a social catastrophe. Of course, such refinement should be no surprise in a nation with a sense of class so acute that, only a few years ago, it was usually possible to tell a man’s social origins by his socks (ideally dark blue or black, calf-length, and never, ever patterned).

But if snobbery is our vice, it isn’t ours alone. England’s trick was to market its snobbery as the best in the world, and then to put it to work. In this, if nothing else, Britain succeeded brilliantly. In his Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire, historian David Cannadine makes the case that the British colonizers often co-opted the “native” social hierarchy (medals all ’round!) into their own in order to assist in the preservation of colonial rule. As any reader of Rudyard Kipling’s Kim will know, class did not always trump race, but as a prop (in both senses) of the glittering imperial structure, it certainly played its part. Even today snobbery remains a useful weapon in London’s diplomatic arsenal, most notably in the awarding of knighthoods to the occasional friendly foreigners. Step forward, “Sir” Norman Schwarzkopf.

Snobbery, then, is not confined to those damp islands off the northwestern coast of Europe. In his entertaining new book, Snobbery: The American Version, author and Northwestern University lecturer Joseph Epstein gives credit where credit is due (“the English are more practiced in snobbery than any other people”), but chooses not to linger too long in Albion. The main focus of his book is snootiness on the western side of the pond, “its perplexities and its perils, its complications and not least its comedy.” On a more serious note (this is, after all, a book by an American academic), he aims to examine “whether snobbery is a constituent part of human nature or instead an aberration brought about by any particular social conditions.” He succeeds admirably in the analysis of the first part of his objective, stumbles over the second, and has problems too with a third, no less important question: what exactly is a snob?

That last difficulty puts Epstein in good company. In his 1848 collection, The Book of Snobs, Thackeray complains that although “the word snob has taken a place in our honest English vocabulary,” it can’t be defined. “We can’t say what it is, any more than we can define wit or humor or humbug; but we know what it is.” Epstein has a similar problem. His notion of the “essence of snobbery” (“arranging to make yourself superior at the expense of other people”) seems to miss the point. Ray Kroc, no snob icon but the man who made McDonald’s what it is today, reportedly said that if he saw a competitor drowning, he would put a live fire hose in his mouth. Superiority is often achieved at the expense of someone else. Such leapfrogging has taken our species from mud huts to the moon. But how superior is that superiority? Epstein writes that “snobbery often entails taking a petty, superficial, or irrelevant distinction and running with it.” He’s right, and if anything is the essence of snobbery, that would be it. Some of his examples, however, are strangely unpersuasive.

Contrary to what Epstein suggests, the driver of a BMW 740i is indeed quite entitled to feel “quietly, assuredly better than the poor vulgarian in his garish Cadillac.” As is acknowledged elsewhere in this book, good taste is not the same as snobbery. Equally, whatever Epstein may think, the parent of a daughter “studying art history at Harvard” need not be ashamed of the “calm pleasure” with which he greets the news that the child of an acquaintance is able to manage only a major in photojournalism at Arizona State University. That parent has, in all probability, earned that moment of satisfaction. The snob is not distinguished from the man of taste by his ability and willingness to discern the difference between a Beamer and a Caddy but by the use he makes of that discernment. Coming to the conclusion that Harvard is better than ASU is not necessarily the mark of the snob: treating an ASU graduate worse, merely because of where he went to college, most surely is.

These lapses into a dismaying (and, one hopes, insincere) egalitarianism are the exception rather than the rule in this book. Epstein soon finds himself on safer ground. Like Thackeray (a comparison that he would, doubtless, accept with “calm pleasure”), Epstein is rather better at identifying snobs than at analyzing snobbery. From a vantage point of somewhat tweedy, curmudgeonly disdain, he offers his readers an enjoyably vicious introduction to the different types of American snob. They are presented as a ludicrous and absurd spectacle, lampooned with a vim and biliousness that is all too rare in an era wherein there is no offense greater than giving offense. Among Epstein’s victims are Susan Sontag (“when young, a knockout American woman who did a fairly decent impression of a European intellectual”), PC “virtucrats” (“What makes the virtucrat a snob is that not only is he smug about the righteousness of his views, but he imputes bad faith to anyone who doesn’t share them. Upon this imputed bad faith he erects his own superiority.”), Gore Vidal (“Self-love, which in him never goes unrequited, is sufficient for this remarkably confident snob.”), and foodies (“When did my dentist begin using the word pasta?”).

Epstein appears to concede that he himself may be something of a snob, but it would be wrong to dismiss his tastes (there are, for example, touches of PBS, academe, and the hair shirt in his rather ostentatious lack of interest in material gain) as routine examples of intellectual snobbery. As he explains elsewhere in the book:

High standards far from being snobbish are required to maintain decency in life. When the people who value these things are called snobs, the word is usually being used in a purely sour-grapes way. Elitist is almost invariably another sour-grapes word, at least when used to denigrate people who insist on a high standard. The distinction is that the elitist desires the best; the snob wants other people to think he has, or is associated with, the best. Delight in excellence is easily confused with snobbery by the ignorant.

Quite. The mere fact that he is so obviously comfortable using a shockingly abrasive word like ignorant tells the reader all he needs to know about Joseph Epstein.

Epstein is even prepared to risk being labeled snobbish about snobbery with his suggestion that American snobbery has itself gone down in the world. In a key chapter (“O WASP, Where Is Thy Sting-a-Ling?”), he chronicles how America’s old White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite walked away from power (and, as he notes in a brilliant, brutal aside, “came away disliked, diminished, maybe even a little despised for having done so”), leaving snobbery unanchored, “setting it afloat if not aloft, to alight on objects other than those connected exclusively with social class,” including, presumably, pasta.

But that’s an exaggeration. Class sensibility was no longer so rooted in ethnicity or tradition as in the past, but, as Paul Fussell showed in his book Class (1983), it was flourishing well into the Reagan era. It continues to do so today, but, so far as snobs are concerned, class has lost much of its glitter. The years of fluid hierarchy and social change have taken their toll. Old notions of caste no longer suffice for truly effective one-upmanship. In response, snobs did what they had to. They evolved.

As snobbery is such a basic instinct, this was only to be expected. Yet, despite the fact that the force and existence of such an instinct explains much of what Epstein describes, he seems curiously unwilling to accept it. In an attempt designed, presumably, to satisfy his objective of seeing whether snobbery can be linked to “particular social conditions,” Epstein asserts that “snobbery as we know it today, [the] snobbery meant to shore up one’s own sense of importance and to make others sorely feel their insignificance” was rarely seen before the nineteenth century. The reason for its expansion, he argues, was the spread of democracy. By unsettling a previously fixed social order, democracy increased the level of insecurity within society. Epstein quotes H. L. Mencken’s observation that, socially speaking, the American is on a perpetually icy slope, wanting to climb “a notch or two,” but “with no wall of caste to protect him if he slips.” As an ersatz class system, snobbery could assist in the struggle to survive within a society that had become suddenly, and frighteningly, competitive.

It is an ingenious theory, but it fails. Snobbery, and its simpering handmaiden, deference, could be witnessed long before the emergence of mass democracy. Epstein need have no doubt that it is, indeed, “a constituent part of human nature.” Let’s take one example. “Novelists,” writes Epstein, “are our keenest sociologists,” and there were none keener than Jane Austen. At the time she was writing, the ballot box was yet to cast much of a shadow over England’s country gentry, and yet her novels are filled with snobbish tension and social unease. And that’s only natural. People have always understood that no social order can be guaranteed to endure forever. Our species has emerged through millennia of turmoil, conflict, disaster, and war, and the lesson it has drawn has been simple: there is never, ever a bad time to be jockeying for position.

If there’s one person who knows about jockeying for position, it is a snob. On its face, Epstein’s comment that “there is something deeply antisocial about the snob” seems puzzling. There is, on the contrary, no one more social. Lacking the talent to succeed on his own merits, the snob is forced to manipulate social convention in such a way as to ensure that he achieves that all-too-necessary commodity, status. Epstein’s complaint, however, is subtler: it is not the snob who is antisocial, but his methods. The snob, he grumbles, “is, in a profound sense, in business for himself,” to which the obvious retort is, “Who isn’t?” Where snobbery can be said to be antisocial is in the misdirection of effort and ability that it implies; but like it or not, its existence is inevitable in any functioning society: a successful organism will always attract parasites.

It is difficult to avoid the feeling that Epstein’s disapproval of his snooty subjects colors his other main theme: that snobs have no fun. His description of the miseries of the snob’s life is bleak indeed. Epstein contends that the snob has only one standard, “that of comparison,” and that this approach to life can bring no “lengthy contentment” because “comparison inevitably implies competition.” There’s something to this; the snob’s self-esteem may be unusually susceptible to the opinions of others. But this is only a question of degree: almost all of us worry about how we are seen by the outside world. Besides, what’s the problem with competition? Epstein’s notion that competition is automatically an ordeal is a view that I suspect (perhaps snobbishly) only an academic could hold. Competition can be agony (check out the scene in Bret Easton Ellis’s repulsive but perceptive novel American Psycho, in which various Wall Street types compare the quality of their business cards), but it can also be ecstasy (Ray Kroc again). It depends on the nature not of the game (which can be snobbish or not), but of the individual who is playing it.

The truth is that, disapproving of snobbery as he does, Epstein desperately wants to believe that snobs must, by definition, be unhappy. In this he is doomed to be disappointed. Like all primates, we are social animals, and therefore status in itself—deserved or not—can be a source of profound satisfaction. The rewards from the superficial can run very, very deep.

It’s not “fair,” of course, but so far as snobs are concerned, that’s just the point.