The Damage Won’t Be Contained to Afghanistan

National Review Online, August 19, 2021

It’s obvious — if not necessarily to the Biden administration — that the success of a nation’s foreign policy depends, in part, on its ability to shape the way in which it is seen abroad. The U.S. was able to ensure the survival of West Berlin — a highly vulnerable exclave — throughout the Cold War in no small part because the Kremlin could never be certain how fiercely America would react if the Soviets attempted to take over the western half of that divided city by force. The Berlin Airlift was an early and remarkable display of support, but the dispatch at the same time of three B-29 bomber groups, which may or may not have been in a position to initiate a nuclear strike, to the U.K. may also have helped persuade Stalin to take things no further. To work, deterrence must be credible. The American, British, and French troops stationed in West Berlin for decades were no more than a tripwire, but Moscow could only speculate about what would follow from triggering it. It never took the risk.

Bringing the Soviets round to the view that this would be too dangerous a gamble to take meant not only building a nuclear arsenal, but also demonstrating — if only, in this case symbolically — a preparedness to use it. The airlift was a symbol of the depth of America’s commitment to West Berlin, as was the tripwire. And the willingness to defend West Berlin was itself the sign of a wider resolve to stand up to the USSR.

In 1948, General Lucius Clay, the administrator of U.S.-occupied Germany, argued that

there is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis. . . . Our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.

While it was important to convince America’s adversaries of its determination, if required, to fight, it was also vital that the U.S. convince its allies (and potential allies) that it could be relied upon. Thus Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty provides that an armed attack on any NATO member “in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack” against every alliance member, each of which “individually and in concert with the other Parties [will take] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

President Biden might like to recall that the only time Article 5 has been invoked in NATO’s history was after 9/11. Many NATO countries fought — incurring casualties as they did so — alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan. Deployment there, for example, cost the lives of 457 British armed-forces personnel. But as the situation began to disintegrate, there appears to have been little consultation with such allies. For the head of the British armed forces to have publicly described the U.S. as “shattering” the morale of Afghan troops by stopping air support is . . . unusual.

The administration’s arrogant, self-absorbed, and irresponsible conduct is not an ideal way to foster trust in the U.S. as a partner in future military ventures. The New York Times’s Mark Landler reported that Tom Tugendhat, a Tory MP who is chairman of the British House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee (and is a veteran of both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars) has said that his country needs to rethink the terms of its relationship with the United States in future security operations. Tugendhat will not have been the only European politician to have been pondering the same topic.

The damage to America’s reputation has been compounded by an apparent absence of much in the way of any serious organization or planning underlying the U.S. evacuation — to give it too orderly a name. Whatever contingency planning existed seems to have been both unimaginative and slapdash. (Why, for instance, give up Bagram so quickly?) The result has been a debacle that has left many reaching for the history books.

In early July, Biden asserted there was no comparison — “None whatsoever. Zero” — between the fall of Saigon and the American withdrawal from Kabul.

In that, at least, he has turned out to be correct. This is far worse.

Whether President Trump was right to have come to the deal he did with the Taliban in Doha is one matter. (I’m unconvinced.) Whether Biden was right to have stuck with it after its terms had repeatedly been breached is another. (He wasn’t.) But however much these two questions might be the subject of legitimate debate, it is hard to deny that Biden’s decision to accept what he knew (whatever he may have said publicly) would be a Taliban triumph within a short time — if not so short as it turned out to be — was reckless in the extreme. And that adjective still applies even if there is some truth to one alternative explanation: The administration had a reasonably good grasp of the risks it was running — and didn’t care.

Equally, it cannot be denied that this whole fiasco has delivered a devastating message about this White House’s priorities, capabilities, and competence. Much more destructively, this message will resonate for years; those hearing it internationally will see it as evidence of American failings far more extensive than simply the blunderings of an incompetent, callous old man.

The result has also been a disaster for millions of Afghans and put many of those of them who worked with the West in mortal peril. Thousands of Americans and the citizens of many allied nations still in Afghanistan also remain in danger. This rout is an insult to the fallen and the wounded — and an American humiliation so profound (which may yet be deepened if a hostage drama develops in Kabul and elsewhere) that its strategic implications will stretch far, far beyond Central Asia.

Among them will be its impact on how America’s allies, starting with those in NATO, regard the U.S. To be an effective deterrent, Article 5 has, like any other deterrent, to be believable. For Article 5 to be believable, America’s willingness to abide by it must be believable. (Vladimir Putin will not be too worried about, say, Germany’s response should Russia invade NATO’s Baltic members.) The flip side of that is that America’s NATO partners must also believe that Uncle Sam will come to their rescue should they come under attack. According to a February 2020 poll (deep into the Trump era), most do. It is difficult to think that the high-handedness, incompetence, and poor judgment displayed by the Biden administration over Afghanistan will do anything other than undermine confidence that that will continue to be the case.

No NATO members will have overlooked the strong element of “America First” that ran through Biden’s shameful and evasive speech on Monday — which, incidentally, included no reference to the sacrifices made by America’s allies. This will have been made no less disconcerting by the near certainty that Biden’s interpretation of America First will result in American tragedy, whether at home, on battlefields abroad, or in Afghanistan in the next few weeks.

To be sure, Donald Trump had not helped transatlantic relations by describing NATO as “obsolete” — a claim he later withdrew, although some wondered how sincerely. And, to be sure, some of the rhetoric that accompanied Trump’s (understandable) effort to persuade certain NATO countries to pay their fair share came alarmingly close to reducing Article 5 to a bargaining chip, a state of affairs that must have intrigued Putin. Nevertheless, this could largely be dismissed by other NATO members as Trump being Trump, a temporary disturbance, nothing more. Now, however, they are confronted with the spectacle of a “respectable” American president, a veteran member of the American political class, proclaiming — albeit more diplomatically than his predecessor — America First, and, ominously, doing so with deeds as well as words.

The State Department will reassure itself with the thought that, however much America’s NATO allies may grumble, the U.S. umbrella is the only one under which they can plausibly shelter. The perpetual reluctance of most EU member states to devote sufficient resources to defense spending suggests that the renewed talk of increased EU strategic autonomy is, for the most part, just talk. All the same, perceptions of American unreliability and weakness will lead to the U.S. enjoying less clout in Europe. Europeans will feel just a bit freer to buy more Russian fossil fuels, or, say, cut some tech deal with China — both for economic reasons and as a way of currying favor from rough powers to whom they may now feel more need to crawl. And if that means turning a blind eye to some fresh aggression in Ukraine or outrage in Xinjiang, so be it . . .

American allies outside NATO must also be feeling a little less confident that Washington has their back, even if, in the case of the most endangered, that may make little difference to their behavior. They have nowhere else to turn, and there is little that they can do to appease the freshly emboldened predators already prowling just nearby. To take one example, all that Taiwan can offer China is a slow-motion surrender. As that, thankfully, is out of the question, Taipei can only hope that Xi Jinping retains enough respect for American power to avoid a direct confrontation over the island.

Even if that hope proves to be justified, the reality of a diminished America might tempt China and Russia to try their luck somewhere with consequences that we will come to regret. Even if they decide, maybe even coordinating their actions, to confine themselves to “lesser” aggressions (Taiwan’s Kinmen/Quemoy and Matsu for China or, in Russia’s case, gnawing away at more of Ukraine), both will now be in a far better position to sell themselves to a wide range of currently only hazily aligned countries as a smarter choice of ally than the faltering, clumsy American giant. This may especially be the case for those run by governments that appreciate a backer who is both reliable and none too fastidious. One of those countries, indeed, may well turn out to be the reborn Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, despite that awkward business about the Uyghurs. It looks as if China will be glad, on certain conditions, to oblige for any number of reasons, one of which will be to heap yet more humiliation on Uncle Sam’s head.

As to the impetus that America’s defeat will give to radical Islamism from the banlieues of Paris to nuclear-armed Pakistan, well, strong horse, weak horse and all that.