Macron’s Moment

National Review Online, April 24, 2017

The news that Emmanuel Macron, the nice centrist candidate, was going to win the first round of France’s presidential election was greeted with undisguised delight by the European Union’s ruling elite. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, is not meant to weigh in on elections that are still underway in EU member states, but rules are for little people. He was quick to pass on his congratulations and wish Macron well in the run-off against the National Front’s not-always-so-nice Marine Le Pen two weeks from now. Juncker’s ‘foreign minister,’ Federica Mogherini, gushed that seeing the EU and French flags fly at Macron’s victory celebration was “the hope and future of our generation.” Michel Barnier tweeted that, as a “patriot and European,” he was confident about Macron’s prospects on May 7, and added that “France must remain European.” What Barnier, the faintly sinister former European Commissioner and member of France’s defeated Republican party who will serve as Brussels’ chief negotiator in the Brexit negotiations, meant by “European” was that France must remain in the EU, something that Le Pen might well put in jeopardy. That’s what really mattered.     

Unemployment in France is approximately 10 percent, more than twice German levels. About a quarter of those between the ages of 16 and 25 are unemployed. French GDP growth has been sluggish for years, and government spending accounts for around 57 percent of GDP, compared with 44 percent in Germany.

Then there is terror: the Charlie Hebdo murders that began 2015, the massacre in Paris that ended it, the truck plowing into crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice last year, and, most recently, the shooting in the Champs-Élysées that left one policeman dead and two other people seriously wounded just days before Sunday’s vote. These attacks are part of a wider Islamist assault on the West, but they are also symptomatic of failings in the effort to integrate France’s large Muslim minority, failings with consequences that have done more than their bit to contribute to the growth of the hard right. In 2016, Patrick Calvar, the head of France’s General Directorate for Internal Security, told a parliamentary enquiry that he feared a “confrontation between the far right and the Muslim world.”

And Federica Mogherini is cheered up by some flags.

Observing the behavior of the Bourbons and their aristocratic entourage on their return to France after the fall of Napoleon, the French statesman Talleyrand is said to have remarked that the king and his entourage had “learned nothing and forgotten nothing.” For some reason that quip came to mind as I read those tweets and other celebratory commentary from, it seemed, every corner of Davosworld,

Looking at Emmanuel Macron, it’s not difficult to understand why. He is one of them — likable, clever, the son of a professor and a doctor, with degrees from the right places, impressive stints in both investment banking and government to his credit, and a fondness for the EU, free trade, and the politics of the Third Way or whatever the old Blairite snake oil is known as these days. As a Socialist minister of the economy, he put together the Loi Macron package of reforms in 2014 and 2015 as a modest — very modest, and it says something about French politics that they had to be forced through by decree — step in toward deregulation. At about the same time, he left the Socialist party, before quitting the government the following year amid speculation about the independent presidential run that duly came to be.

There’s another problem for the tale of populist retreat: Between Le Pen’s share of the first-round vote (roughly 21.5 percent) and that of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, left-wing maniac and standard-bearer of France Unbowed (about 19.5 percent), four out of ten first-round ballots were cast for champions of the hard right and left. At 23.9 percent, Macron came out ahead of both of them, but not that far ahead. As establishment triumphs go, this looks a touch thin, even more so after you remember that neither of the two main parties managed to get their man into the final round. Former prime minister François Fillon, of the center-right Republicans, had looked at one point to be a strong challenger, but his campaign was dragged down by scandal. He is under criminal investigation, as is his wife, so the fact that he still managed to reach nearly 20 percent of the vote gives a hint of what might have been. As for the official candidate of the Socialist Party, poor Benoît Hamon, he was eclipsed by Macron and left with barely more than 6 percent of the vote.    

So what now? Le Pen will press on, as candidates described as far right so often do, with a mix of policies from both ends of the political spectrum, a mix that has not harmed her blue-collar appeal. Her tough line on immigration and Islamic extremism is accompanied by a somewhat protectionist economic platform designed to appeal to those who have found themselves struggling to keep up. This blend runs through into Le Pen’s Euroskepticism, driven from the right by nationalism and from the left by her suspicion of the EU’s attachment to what is, by French standards, an over-fondness for the free market. Oh yes, she’d also pull France out of NATO.

When Macron (who has been endorsed by Fillon and Hamon, but not, interestingly, by Mélenchon, who has said he won’t be endorsing anybody) wins in the second round — and he will — the next hurdle he’ll face is the parliamentary elections in June. No one knows how his fledgling party, En Marche! (echoes of Jeb!) will fare, but assuming that coattails and a honeymoon work their magic, enough of his team may make it into the National Assembly to form the nucleus of some sort of centrist coalition. But putting that together is still likely to involve horse trading of a type that won’t make it easy to build even on the meager reformist achievements of the Loi Macron, let alone address the mess in which France — statist, sclerotic, and stuck with the Euro — now finds itself.

Away from the economy, Macron appears to believe that there is not that much that can be done about mass immigration (climate change is, he explains — of course he does — one of its causes). This is not something that appears to worry him much, and it’s not only National Front voters who will find his lack of concern off-putting. As for doing a better job of integrating France’s Muslim minority, it’s far from clear that Macron has anything new to offer. The same may hold true of terrorism. “This imponderable, this threat,” Macron explained after the Champs-Élysées shootings, “will be a fact of daily life in the coming years.”

France’s next presidential election isn’t until 2022, but Marine Le Pen — or someone like her — will be waiting, and that wait may not be in vain.

Sarko's Bite

National Review, December 15, 2008

It is a ritual as frustrating, as funny, and as familiar as Charlie Brown, Lucy, and the football. A new “right wing” French president is elected, vowing reform, and American conservatives swoon. First there was Jacques Chirac. Older, sadder, and wiser folk may still recall the excited talk about his summer at Harvard, his stint as a soda jerk at Howard Johnson’s, and, naturellement, a girl from South Carolina. The Frenchman liked us! He really liked us! He wasn’t Mitterrand! No, he wasn’t, but . . .

After Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy. The new president’s first vacation was spent not on the Cote d’Azur, but in Wolfeboro, N.H. A few months later “Sarko l’Americain” addressed a joint session of Congress, spoke warmly of the American dream, and name-checked John Wayne, Marilyn Monroe, and Martin Luther King. The Frenchman likes us! He really likes us! He isn’t Chirac! Sarkozy promised a more robust approach to Islamic extremism both at home and abroad and, more daring still, an assault on the regulations, overspending, taxes, and trade-union privilege that have made France so much less than she could be. America’s conservatives cheered. Fries could be French again.

That was then. Less than a year later, Sarkozy took the opportunity presented by the financial meltdown to announce, with rather too much glee, the death of laissez-faire, a declaration made all the more surprising by the fact that there is little evidence that laissez-faire had been alive in the first place. Perhaps that’s why Sarkozy is so keen to do a Van Helsing on the poor doctrine’s corpse. Like the United States and most other major nations, France has put together a massive (in its case, up to €360 billion) rescue package for its banks, but with a characteristically French twist: It is insisting that the banks that benefit from this largesse increase their lending by a designated amount (3 to 4 percent) over a given twelve-month period, a mandate almost guaranteed to wreak further financial havoc. “The state,” thundered Sarkozy, “is back.”

It had never been away. But the state’s command over the French economy will become even more wide-ranging with the establishment of a new strategic-investment fund (up to €20 billion, although larger numbers have been mentioned) to protect key companies from the unwanted attentions of wicked foreign predators. Somewhat more conventionally, the government will increase what it spends on contrats aides, which will subsidize an additional 100,000 jobs next year. With carrot comes stick: Sarkozy has cautioned companies against using the crisis as a cover for layoffs: “Those who want to play that game be warned: The government will be ruthless.” The state is indeed “back.”

So far, so French. Much more worrying is the extent to which Sarkozy’s revenant state is now looking to expand its reach internationally. Sarkozy is busy telling anyone who will listen (and quite a few who won’t) that the financial crisis has demonstrated the need to establish a “clearly identified economic government” for the eurozone. Quite what that might mean is not easy to identify, but some clues can be found in Sarkozy’s suggestion that equivalents of France’s new strategic-investment fund be set up throughout the zone. As the French president told the EU’s parliament in October, he didn’t “want European citizens to wake up” and find out that their companies had been taken over by wily “non-European” investors who had taken advantage of low share prices to snap up a few bargains. To Europe’s last serving Thatcherite, Czech president Vaclav Klaus, the thinking behind the Sarkozy scheme reeked of “old socialism.” It’s difficult to disagree.

For now the idea of constructing a Maginot Line against foreign capital has found few takers elsewhere in the EU, but an undaunted Sarkozy is taking his crusade against the supposed “dictatorship of the market” even farther afield. The French president was a key figure in pushing for the recent G-20 summit in Washington. In itself, the idea of a meeting involving more than the usual G-8 suspects was no bad thing. Financial panics recognize no borders. That said, final responsibility for managing such crises must remain at the national level for reasons of common sense, practicality, and — critically — sovereignty.

Strengthening international cooperation in this area will be a positive development, but only so long as efforts are organized multilaterally. On that basis, the G-20’s search for a closer consensus on matters such as accounting standards, clearing facilities for credit-default swaps, banks’ capital-adequacy ratios, and the role of rating agencies is something to be welcomed, not feared.

The same is true of the mooted development of an IMF-run early-warning system. Another of the summit’s themes, boosting the existing levels of cooperation between different national regulatory authorities, also makes obvious sense, as do, in theory, plans to create (pompously named) “supervisory colleges” for all major cross-border financial institutions. Staffed by regulators from the various relevant jurisdictions, these bodies would be designed to provide an additional degree of surveillance and, it is hoped (the details are tellingly scant), be in a position to head off crises before they arise. The focus of international coordination in this area would thus shift from the reactive to the proactive. These are all changes that, if sensibly handled, could be useful steps forward.

If Sarkozy gets his way, sensible is one thing they won’t be. In no small respect this is a function of his personality: restless, kinetic, opportunistic, and incapable of resisting either the temptation of la grande geste or, as he sees it, the splendor of his own genius. We are speaking, after all, of the architect of the proposed “Mediterranean Union.” (You’ve never heard of it?) In the endearingly acid words of a woman quoted in Dawn, Dusk or Night (playwright Yasmina Reza’s magnificently offbeat account of a year spent with Sarkozy on the campaign trail): “Nicolas is too high-strung. . . . He is four inches too short and that undermines his charisma on the international level. Mitterrand, you couldn’t tell he was short because he was placid, whereas Nicolas is a fox terrier running everywhere, barking.”

But it’s possible to detect patterns in all that motion, and one of them is the hyperpresident’s bathyscaphe-deep distrust of the free market. Sarkozy’s forlorn American conservative fans would have done well to read his Testimony (2006), a manifesto for the modernization of France that is, at its core, technocratic, profoundly dirigiste (“It seems to me to be perfectly reasonable . . . that a profitable company not be allowed to benefit from a cut in taxes if it does not raise salaries”), Colbertist (“It is not illegitimate for the finance minister to promote the creation of national . . . champions”), neo-protectionist (“I propose that exports from countries that do not respect environmental rules be taxed according to how much they pollute”), and, in its dismissive references to Wal-Mart’s “brutal and unacceptable” business practices, “stock market capitalism,” and “speculators and predators,” not particularly friendly to the American way of making a buck.

Strongly nationalist though he is, Sarkozy is too shrewd to believe that France can go it alone. So, like his predecessors, he tries to manipulate the EU’s structures in ways intended to produce a Europe that looks like France, a Europe where France can be France, a Europe ideally (in Sarkozy’s view) stripped of its “dogmatic commitment to competition” and what he sees as a race to the bottom in fiscal and social policy. Translation: The Irish should be forced to raise their taxes so that the French aren’t forced to cut theirs. All in the name of European unity, of course.

It’s easy to see how the economic crunch has offered France (acting in conjunction with a good number of other nations) a similar opportunity — to remake the world’s financial system in something much closer to its own image (all in the name of ending the crisis, of course), which would have the added bonus of diminishing America’s economic dominance and, with it, Washington’s power to set the global agenda.

Yes, financial reform, tougher domestic regulation, and smarter international coordination are all required, but these should be accomplished through incremental changes. There’s no need to tear up the old rulebook. Any transfers of authority to new transnational authorities should be kept to an absolute minimum, a priority that is difficult to reconcile with all the chatter (from Sarkozy and others) of a new Bretton Woods.

The French president left the G-20 summit reportedly claiming that the “animal spirits” of American capitalism had been tamed and that the days of a single currency (the dollar) are “over.” The hyperpresident has, he undoubtedly believes, got the hyperpower on the run. Rubbing yet more salt in Uncle Sam’s wounds, Sarkozy then surprised everyone (one European diplomat was reported by the International Herald Tribune as describing the announcement as “amazing”) with news that he was convening a conference in Paris (co-hosted by the inevitable Tony Blair) in early January to, in Blair’s words, “define a new model of capitalism.”

The fox terrier, it appears, does not just bark. He bites

Veil of Tears

National Review Online, April 21, 2004

"Islam," as Samuel Huntington wrote, "has bloody borders." True enough, but in an age of mass immigration where are those borders? Precise numbers are hard to come by, but there are now thought to be at least 12 million Muslims within the EU, territories where, no more than half a century ago, Islam was little more than exotica, a religion of far-off desert places, its presence a distant, if troubling, memory; the faith of the Ottoman empire that, at its peak, reached the gates of Vienna; the faith of the Moors, who swept through Spain, advanced deep into France, and ruled Andalusia for hundreds of years; the faith of the Barbary pirates, slavers and scourge. And then, when a booming postwar Europe started looking south and east for sources of new labor, history went into reverse. Muslims returned, but as immigrants this time, not invaders. Their stories vary from individual to individual and from country to country, but almost everyone can agree on one point: In France, where there are five million Muslims (about 7.5 percent of the population; other estimates are significantly higher), something has gone terribly wrong.

Even by the low standards of Western Europe, the integration of France's Muslim minority (which is predominantly of Arab/North African ancestry) has been patchy, to put it kindly. Isolated in the desolation of the cités, high-rise, dole-queue suburbs generally located a discreet distance from the principal urban centers, many Muslims are cut off from the French mainstream physically, economically, and psychologically. It's no surprise that the primitive—and reassuring—certainties of Islamic fundamentalism have found an audience. How great an audience is a matter of dispute, and, inevitably in the country of Le Pen's National Front, racist mythologizing. Pick an anecdote or a statistic for yourself, but whether it's rising anti-Semitism, or the horrifyingly routine gang rape of Muslim girls who step out of line, or increasingly politicized violence, they all suggest that a catastrophe is in the making.

And successive French governments have not had a clue what to do. The unspoken, and ludicrous, hope was that most immigrants—including, presumably, their French-born children—would return "home," allowing the problem to subside. They haven't and it didn't.

Affirmative action might (or might not) have helped, but it ran contrary to the founding notion of a republic where all citizens were simply French regardless of race or religion, and was never really tried. Equally, France's prickly sense of its own identity left less room for the sloppy sense of diversity that arguably bought (until recently) a broad measure of social peace on the other side of the English Channel. Meanwhile, high rates of ethnic-minority unemployment (25 percent or more in some areas) meant that the workplace was no longer the effective engine of assimilation that it had once been.

Prompted partly by post-9/11 panic, the government has at least acknowledged that all is not well, but its attempts to help have often made things worse. Last year the then interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, no bleeding heart, set up a "Muslim Council" (Sarkozy has also been flirting with support for affirmative action) as an equivalent to similar, and long-established, bodies for Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. A suitably safe moderate was selected as chairman, but when the process moved from selection to election, disaster ensued. Depending on how you count them, fundamentalists won at least one third of the seats. Designed to enshrine a moderate "French" Islam, the new council may in fact have helped legitimate extremists as an authentic representative voice of France's Muslims.

The position taken by the French government over the Iraq war only added to the problem. To the extent that Chirac's motive was to appease the country's Muslims, he failed. By radicalizing the debate, and bringing paranoia about America, "the West," and, quelle surprise, Israel onto center stage, France's president succeeded in inflaming the very hatreds his policy was designed to damp down. To be sure, there were signs, as the tanks rolled into Iraq, that even Chirac was becoming alarmed at the tone that the rhetoric, and worse, was taking. His emollient prime minister was dispatched to make a few emollient remarks: anti-Semitism was, Jean-Pierre Raffarin soothed, a bad, bad thing. But by then, it was too late.

When their policies are failing, politicians like to create a diversion. Jacques Chirac is no exception. A commission he set up last July to look at the treatment of religion in an explicitly secular republic came up with 25 recommendations, including, for example, the suggestion that Yom Kippur and Eid al-Kabir should be school holidays, but the French government has chosen to act on only one, that "conspicuous signs of religious adherence" should be banned from public schools. These include yarmulkes and "large" crucifixes but, given that neither Orthodox Jews nor Assyrian-Chaldean Christians (tiny community, large crosses) pose much of a threat to France's established order, adding these items is just so much multiculturalist window dressing. The real target of this legislation is Islamic head covering. In France that's usually a headscarf ("foulard"). Chirac's frequent references to the veil ("voile") are just demagoguery: The burka, I suspect, is rarely seen in Bordeaux. With opinion polls showing 70-percent approval, the new law swept through the national assembly by 494-36 in February, and then, a month later, was approved 276-20 in the senate. The new rules will come into force from the beginning of the school year in September.

Criticism has come from some very predictable sources. Bin Laden's number two, the nutcase doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri (or a mimic pretending to be al-Zawahiri) denounced the ban as "new evidence of the Crusaders' hatred for Muslims." Those comments, of course, should be treated with contempt, as should complaints from those Muslim countries that have themselves proved very hostile to public displays of any religion other than Islam. France, of course, has seen a significant number of protests, almost always featuring women in headscarves, lambs voting for Ramadan. Other critics have included, Human Rights Watch, senior United Nations officials, the United States, and even, obliquely, the pope.

There are indeed obvious—and compelling—libertarian objections to the new law as a restriction of religious freedom, but to characterize it as a simple expression of bigotry is to do it an injustice. In theory at least, the law is merely a principled application of laïcité, the state secularism that is roughly analogous to the separation of church and state in the United States. Seen in those terms the law is certainly no more oppressive than some of the more rigid First Amendment rulings seen in this country in recent years. What's more, if freedom is the issue, what about the freedom of those Muslim girls who choose not to wear the headscarf, a freedom increasingly under threat from fundamentalist bullying.

In a recent article, one member of the presidential commission recalled how, after initial doubts, he was convinced to support a ban. "Since 1989...and especially in the last two to three years, it has become clear that in schools where some Muslim girls do wear the headscarf and others do not, there is strong pressure on the latter to "conform."  This daily pressure takes different forms, from insults to violence...We received testimonies of Muslim fathers who had to transfer their daughters from public to (Catholic) private schools where they were free of pressure to wear the headscarf.... In the increasing number of schools where girls wear the hijab, a clear majority of Muslim girls who do not wear the headscarf...asked the commission to ban all public displays of religious belief. A large majority of Muslim girls do not want to wear the scarf; they too have the right of freedom of conscience. Principals and teachers have tried their best to bring back some order in an impossible situation where pressure, insults, or violence sets pupils against one another, yet where to protest against this treatment is seen as treason to the community."

To read those words is to understand that the post-Enlightenment West, where the principle of religious freedom has carried little cost in societies where religion was either in retreat, or at the very least accepted boundaries set by the state, is ill-equipped to deal with the challenge posed by an aggressive, growing, fundamentalist faith steeped in a very different tradition. In this conflict, Western notions of what is "political" and what is "religious" are next to meaningless. Seen one way, the hijab is nothing more than a simple expression of piety, seen another it is a political statement, no less threatening than the brown shirts and red stars of previous eras.

That said, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that, even where it does not topple over into absurdity (under certain circumstances, beards too, and even bandanas, can be banned), the new law will make a bad situation worse, radicalizing the previously indifferent, creating flashpoint after flashpoint, confrontation after confrontation and, ironically, turning the hijab, a symbol of repression if ever there was one, into a token of rebellion guaranteed to appeal to the very adolescents the law is designed to govern. Worse still, this move is highly likely to spur the creation of separate Muslim schools (which under French law would be eligible for generous government subsidy) where the headscarf ban would not apply, something that would deepen still further the intellectual isolation of their pupils from the French mainstream. To add to France's predicament, if there's one thing potentially more disastrous than the enforcement of this law, it would be its repeal. Repeal would be seen as an acknowledgement of French weakness in the face of the fundamentalists, empowering them still further, and would add to the mounting unease of the native French, the Français de souche, about the Muslims in their midst. Jean-Marie le Pen could not ask for more.

Yes, it's a mess, but that's the danger of trying to solve a deep-seated, difficult, and sensitive problem with a quick, politically expedient, fix. Halting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in France is going to take time, determination, generosity, and, just as importantly, a willingness to fight the battle of ideas in a way that won't be easy in a country held in thrall to the PC bogeyman of "Islamophobia."

Don't hold your breath.