A Soviet Brigadoon

National Review Online, January 8, 2013

Sillamäe Town Hall, Estonia, August 2012 © Andrew Stuttaford

It’s not easy to surprise Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonia’s sharp and savvy president, but I reckon I succeeded. In September, I was in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, to interview him for National Review. In the small talk before we turned to the euro, economic recovery, Russia, the usual, he asked me where else I had been on this visit to his country. “Sillamäe,” I replied. The presidential eyebrows rose, just a bit. Maybe there was a word thrown in too, an “interesting,” something like that.

The author of the Lonely Planet’s 1994 guide to the Baltic States and Kaliningrad would have been blunter. After explaining that Sillamäe had been “built after WW II to support a military nuclear-chemicals plant,” an over-simplification that will do for now, he went on to tempt the tougher end of the tourist trade with this: “according to press reports, the plant’s waste dump contains several tons of radioactive and highly toxic wastes, surrounded only by an earth wall 10 meters wide and is already contaminating ground water and the Baltic Sea.”

It was worse than that. The waste dump, euphemistically a waste depository, was a large lagoon, a Leninist lake, toxic and vile, described by the man responsible for cleaning it up as a “uranium pond” hosting some twelve million tons of a sludge containing “uranium, heavy metals, acids and other chemicals.” A testament to Soviet environmental sensitivity, it was open to the air, set on far-from-ideal clay, encircled by a poorly constructed wall, and located just a few yards from the sea. It leaked, and the overspill after heavy rainfall added to the mess. In 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency labeled the site a serious radioactive risk. Four years earlier the New Scientist had reported that many of Sillamäe’s children were losing their hair. The clean-up was finally completed in 2008. I was told that what’s left of the waste is buried (with other safeguards) under a man-made hill that juts out onto the Baltic shore.

“Will that do the trick?”

“Hope so.”

Where the waste is (somewhere), Sillamäe, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

Other traces of Sillamäe’s strange history remain well above ground.

A three-hour trip to Tallinn’s east on a bus that will end up in St. Petersburg, this sleepy, gently-shrinking, largely Russian-speaking town of some 14,000 people is located at a point just a few miles from the Russian border — and at a moment poised somewhere between Estonia’s painful history and its infinitely more promising present. Before the war, there had been just a few houses here, and a Swedish-owned shale oil processing plant. When Estonia’s Soviet “liberators” returned in 1944, the local variety of oil shale (dictyonema argillite, in case you were wondering) interested them very much indeed. Among the minerals that lurked within it was uranium, something which Stalin had — up to then — found rather hard to obtain, but wanted very badly.

The old Swedish works had been destroyed during the war, but a new production unit — Kombinat no. 7, and a new town that was intended to support it — was built, much of it by the forced labor of convicts and POWs. The latter included many Balts caught up in the conflict between their homelands’ Nazi and Soviet invaders. More than half a century later, the facility’s new Estonian owners stripped away sheetrock in its administration building to reveal well-crafted brickwork. A section has been kept exposed as a memorial of sorts to those that worked — and died — here, often in appalling conditions. Just outside is a small Soviet-era monument to the Great Patriotic War, a war that Estonia was doomed to lose regardless of which of its totalitarian occupiers might prevail. History is a via dolorosa in this part of the world.

After the prisoners came yet more wreckage of war, those still remembered in Sillamäe as “the orphans.” As the plant — the USSR’s first fully operational uranium-processing facility — was completed, teenaged survivors of the siege of Leningrad were shipped in to be trained as additions to its workforce. Production started up, beginning with local material, but then switched to higher-grade ore shipped from all over Moscow’s empire. Some 100,000 tons of uranium were produced between 1946 and 1990 for both civilian and military use, a total exceeded in only two other sites in the whole Soviet bloc.

The town grew, but behind a cordon of secrecy, denial, and security. It slipped off and on the map. Sometimes it had a name, sometimes a code. It was a closed town. Access was strictly restricted. It was years before Estonians were allowed to work there (and only a handful did thereafter). For a while, the town was administered, not as a part of Soviet Estonia, but as an exclave of Soviet Russia itself.

There was something else that set Sillamäe apart. Narva, a larger city nearby, and once a jewel of the Northern Baroque, was brutally and slovenly rebuilt after the war as a generic Soviet settlement with a population to match. To be sure, there’s some of that in Sillamäe, but this was a town with a very special purpose. Those who controlled it understood that it would work better if its inhabitants — who included some highly qualified technical staff — were treated better than the Soviet norm. Sillamäe’s center is, I’ll say it, nice, a beautifully preserved showpiece for a Stalinist architecture that is, for once, neither botched, nor slum, nor Mordor. But in feel and former function, if not in appearance, it is also faintly reminiscent of the unsettling picturesque of the Village that housed The Prisoner’s Number Six.

Sillamäe , Estonia, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

This creates a vague sense of unease only underlined by the extent to which the past still lingers on here. This must be one of the few places in Estonia where the symbols of the old regime, the hammers, the sickles, the stars, can still be seen in public, discreetly incorporated into the pale, pastel facades of the buildings of downtown. That they are still in place speaks volumes about the attitude of the locals, and, rather more reassuringly, about the self-confidence of the re-born Estonian Republic, and the relative sensitivity with which it handles the ethnic Russian minority (reduced now to perhaps 25 percent of the country’s population) that remains the most troubling relic of Moscow’s colonial rule.

2 Mere Puiestee, Sillamäe Estonia, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

 
The predominant architectural style at the town’s heart is what came to be known as “retrospectivist” (yes, really), backward-looking, fortified by the reassurance of a past that predated the storms of the 20th century. Many of the buildings play with neoclassical themes. Beyond that there are stately white staircases with a touch of old Odessa about them, a neatly laid-out park, a curious statue of a man lifting, I think, a symbolic atom, a lovely tree-lined avenue, a dignified cultural center, and a fine cinema by the name of Rodina. That’s Russian for “motherland,” but whether that referred to the shared Soviet home or Mother Russia herself was never quite clear. Neither interpretation was likely to appeal to Estonians, but Estonia is a tolerant sort of place and the cinema, along with the cultural center, has enjoyed protected status for over a decade. Across the street stands the town hall, inspired by the design of a traditional Estonian Lutheran church, something that the Soviets must have thought was innocuous enough to be the subject of pastiche. The same, presumably, could be said of the nods to traditional Estonian manor houses that can be seen elsewhere in town.

Mere Puiestee,Sillamäe, Estonia, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

Uranium production in Sillamäe was abandoned in 1990. Soviet rule in Estonia collapsed the next year, and Sillamäe rejoined the world. The facility, renamed Silmet, was privatized, sold, resold, and sold again. Since 2011, by which time Silmet had become one of only two centers in Europe for the processing of rare earths (elements that are crucial for a wide range of electronics), it has been owned by the U.S. mining group, Molycorp.

Atom monument, Sillamäe, Estonia, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

But Sillamäe itself, adrift from time and place, a Soviet Brigadoon but forever in full view, endures. There’s a tucked-away town museum (judging by the friendly, but astonished, welcome I received from the three or four ladies who preside there, I was the first visitor for weeks). Apart from some atrocious local art and a collection of dolls that looks as if it has been curated by a serial killer, it boasts a couple of rooms that give a bric-a-brac impression of everyday life during Sillamäe’s Soviet past.

Town Museum, Sillamäe, Estonia, August 2012 © Andrew Stuttaford

Then again, wandering around town will do pretty much the same thing (if you ignore the well-stocked shops). Ethnic Russians continue to make up the overwhelming majority of the town’s population. Dreaming, perhaps, of the lost certainties of Brezhnev’s day, babushkas still wander down Mere Avenue as it sweeps grandly down to the Baltic. Lenin Avenue has gone, but there are streets named after Russian literary figures and the first cosmonaut too. Up by the bus station, there’s an imposing Soviet war memorial with flowers at its base.

Soviet war memorial, Sillamäe, Estonia, August 2012, © Andrew Stuttaford

But, despite pot-stirring by the Kremlin, and the occasional eruption (most notoriously over the removal to a less prominent place of another Soviet memorial — this time in Tallinn), time, the passing of the older generation, Estonia’s remarkable economic performance, and access to the rest of the EU have all brought a measure of live-and-let-live to relations between the country’s two principal ethnic groups. Unlike in Latvia, where the demographics are even more delicately balanced, there is no specifically “Russian” party represented in the Estonian Parliament, and once-noisy calls for the autonomy of the still hardscrabble Russian-speaking Northeast have died down. Both in Sillamäe and in Tallinn I was assured that younger Russians are at last learning Estonian (even if, understandably enough, their Estonian peers are reluctant to learn Russian, the language of their country’s former oppressor), something that may even give them something of an employment edge in a country that is in practice, if not in law, bilingual.

When it comes to this topic, David O’Brock, the engaging Ohio native (and long-time resident of Estonia) who runs Molycorp Silmet, is cautiously upbeat about what lies ahead. Almost all the workers at his factory are ethnic Russians and many, even the middle-aged and older, are studying Estonian, or other languages that could be of use in a world that now extends far beyond Moscow’s reach.

A once-closed town is opening up. And in more ways than one.

Shatner’s World

Shatner's World - We Just Live in It

National Review Online, May 1, 2012

James T. Kirk has been voyaging through my head since I was about ten years old, ambassador for a Technicolor, offbeat, promising, and very American future that caught my very British imagination in about 1968 and has never quite let go. But the only time I had ever seen William Shatner — the real McCoy, so not to speak — in the flesh was in a New York City steakhouse a few years back. It was a brush with nostalgia and a certain askew greatness, and it was not enough.

Under the circumstances, the hundred-minute one-man show that Shatner launched on Broadway this February (his first appearance there for half a century), and which traveled the country for the next couple of months, was not to be missed. An Away Team was assembled in midtown Manhattan. Only one of its members (no, not this writer) was wearing a Starfleet shirt. We headed to 45th Street and found the entrance of a theater festooned with Shatnerabilia and filled with carbon-based life forms who had probably made their first contact with Star Trek in the dark era somewhere between the last of the original series and the first of the movies (and no, the cartoons don’t count). For an extra couple of hundred dollars, it would have been possible to meet Shatner in person. But these are hard times, and we were not Ferengi.

The successor to the 2011 Canadian How Time Flies: An Evening with William Shatner (Winnipeg! Edmonton! Regina!) and another Commonwealth treat, Australia’s Kirk, Crane, and Beyond: Shatner Live, that preceded it, Shatner’s World: We Just Live in It was promoted in ways that included splendidly arch commercials and a poster. The latter featured a photo of a smiling Shatner, complete with heroic hairline (how, Jim, how?) and a model of the planet we had previously thought was ours. That image was capped by the show’s logo, which had room for another picture of Shatner, a drawing this time, with his smile just that bit more knowing.

But if the joke was on us, it was gentle and hardly a secret. The banner that decorates Shatnersworld.com wraps bragging (“iconic,” “handsome,” and “smooth”) in self-parody and adds the invitation to play along: “Who doesn’t want to be a part of William Shatner’s world?”

Not me. And. Not. William. Shatner. There is something both endearing and impressive about the way this veteran trouper (81 on March 22, Kirk’s birthday too), chunkier now than in that future when he had wrestled with Gorn and liberated Triskelion, tips his toupee at age, flips his finger at the critics, and just carries right on. On a stage backlit with stars (of course), he was clad in weekend CEO casual, suit jacket and jeans, and was creaky but kinetic, pacing around, sitting down in his chair, getting up from his chair (not that chair, incidentally), sometimes almost breaking into a trot as he reminisced about the early days, about growing up Jewish in Montreal, about Broadway back when, about television back when, about hitchhiking across America, about playing Shakespeare at Canada’s Stratford, about half-celebrities of once upon a time, about family and horses, about a tricky encounter with Koko the clever gorilla, about more than half a lifetime on big screen and small. Alexander the Great? Really? A film in Esperanto? Jes, that too.

Some stories slid lightly and slightly by, late-night-talk-show confidences; others were given a fuller shtick, as this venerable spieler gamely, if not always effectively, tried to take us up and down an emotional range that he could not quite — never could quite — convey. There was some embarrassing philosophizing — oh well — and there were some good jokes, deftly told; the best involved George Takei, the next best, another seasoned antagonist, the parvenu Star Wars. His voice is still strong, more gravelly these days, more dinner theater maybe than Captain Picard’s rich Royal Shakespeare Company baritone (Patrick Stewart’s flair for the Bard must hurt, just a bit) but — even now — fully flavored with that evocative and familiar ham. And, as always, there was the leavening of the likable, if not always convincing, self-deprecation that has become his trademark.

Sporadic twilights darkened Shatner’s World, and not just those of that zone, which he twice visited. There was quite a bit of talk, occasionally maudlin, about death — of his father’s passing (touching), of Steve Jobs’s closing moments (strange), of the debate over the moment (“Oh my”) when Captain Kirk met his end, an event that Shatner had fretted was not going to be treated with the seriousness it deserved.

Shatner has grown protective of the captain he once played. The resentment he once felt for the spaceman who eclipsed the Shakespearean (we were told about his last-minute Henry V) has vanished. It is as Kirk that Shatner will be remembered, and he has come to be proud of that. Naturally the show starts with him walking onto the stage to the cheesy cosmic woo-woo of the Star Trek theme. It’s Kirk’s soundtrack and his too. Then there was the moment when he was standing beneath an image of his much younger self — prime Kirk, immortal — projected onto an enormous circular screen with a hint of some strange new world about it. And yes, yes, to see that was something. A projection of Shatner as a young, half-naked barbarian in a Broadway Tamburlaine the Great was rather less so, and (if I remember correctly) a shot of Jeff Flake from Barbary Coast (oh, look it up) was even more less so, but all these Shatners — and there were plenty to choose from — were reminders that this actor still wants us to know that he contains multitudes.

But back to Shatnersworld.com for a mission statement and eccentric typography: “I haven’t saved the universe countless times (or even once), but a part of me is Captain Kirk. I’m not a hard-bitten, L.A. cop, but a part of me is T. J. Hooker. I’m not an addled (well, maybe), high-powered attorney, but a part of me is Denny Crane. I’ve had many other roles, on-screen and off . . . Husband, father, friend. Horseman, Singer, Philanthropist,NEGOTIATOR. All of the parts contribute to the whole, AND IT MAKES FOR ONE HELL OF A STORY!”

Maybe, but, as entertaining as Shatner tried to make it, it was not the story that many in the audience had come to hear. What they were craving (well, I know I was) was the old campfire tales, and a curated trip back to the yesterdays we had all, one way or another, shared with a starship. They were hoping for Nimoy gossip, Scotty dish, and the frequently told untold truth about Gene Roddenberry. But if their — our — wishes had been fulfilled, Shatner’s World would have been spinning through a very well-traveled orbit indeed, that of the Star Trek convention circuit, more suited to some Sheraton somewhere in nowhere than to Broadway. The tickets would have sold, nonetheless. The fans are like that.

Like Star Trek in all its incarnations, they just keep coming back. And so does Shatner. The man who once would rather have no longer been Kirk now most definitely still is. To have devoted more of his one-man show to exploring his own long relationship with Kirk  would not exactly have been to go where, well, you know, but it would have added meat to the meta. Instead we had to make do with an anecdote or two that only hinted at the strangeness of a life dominated by a collective fantasy that would not go away.

Shatner concluded with a song, “Real,” from Has Been, the album with a characteristically canny, self-mocking title that he released a few years back, just one of a series of recordings that have fed off the notoriety of earlier musical catastrophes. No, he cannot carry a tune, but Shatner, self-congratulatory, self-mocking, unstoppable, is not the type to let a technicality like that hold him back, so he sort of sang, sort of seriously:

And while there’s a part of me in that guy you’ve seen

Up there on that screen, I am so much more.

And I wish I knew the things you think I do.

I would change this world for sure.

But I eat and sleep and breathe and bleed and feel.

Sorry to disappoint you, but I’m real.

Sort of.

Grade School

National Review, February 6, 2012

Niagara Falls, October 1989  © Andrew Stuttaford

When watching a disaster movie it’s occasionally worth pausing to take stock of where the main drama, obscured by subplots, rubble, and confusion, really stands.

Standard & Poor’s announcement, on, suitably, Friday the 13th, that it had downgraded nine euro-zone countries in various disapproving ways was a chance for just such a moment. S&P’s stripping France and Austria of their highly prized triple-A ratings grabbed the headlines. The downgrades of less-than‒Black Card nations such as Cyprus, Italy, and Spain (each down two notches, to BB+, BBB+, and A, respectively) added the clickety-click of tumbling dominoes to the story. But most striking of all was the rating agency’s release of answers to questions it anticipated it would be asked about the downgrades, answers that portrayed the euro-zone crisis in ways that Angela Merkel, in particular, will not have wanted to hear.

This mess is not, explained S&P, just about the debt. While their governments’ “lack of fiscal prudence” had undeniably played a part in some countries’ arrival in the PIIGS sty, not least in the case of a certain Hellenic Republic, this was not always the case. “Spain and Ireland . . . ran an average fiscal deficit of 0.4% of GDP and a surplus of 1.6% of GDP, respectively, [between] 1999 [and] 2007,” a period in which, the agency added, a touch cattily, Germany had run a deficit averaging 2.3 percent.

So what had gone wrong? S&P makes coy references to “boom-time developments” and “the rapid expansion of European banks’ balance sheets,” but appears unwilling to spell out too bluntly how the mirage -- promoted in Brussels, Frankfurt, and elsewhere -- of economic convergence (and whispered hints of mutual support) within the euro zone did so much to set in motion the spree of mispriced lending (Irish real estate is just one of many hideous examples) that has now unraveled to such destructive effect.

That’s a shame, because publicizing the truth about those years might have helped counteract the notion, heavily pushed by the EU’s elite, that the euro zone’s troubles are the result of market failure, when in fact they are the product of just the opposite. The devastation of recent years is in no small part the consequence of economic reality’s finally returning to a space from which it had been barred by the introduction of a “one size fits all” currency that was, of course, nothing of the sort. Perhaps S&P was concerned that dwelling too much on the misdeeds of the past might further infuriate a euro-zone leadership that has fallen menacingly out of love with the rating agencies that were once its accomplices (less than two years ago S&P was, remarkably, still treating Greek debt as “investment grade”) but are now, belatedly, stumbling along the road to long-overdue repentance.

Instead, the agency looks forward. As mirages tend to do, convergence is receding: “The key underlying issue for the eurozone as a whole is one of a growing [emphasis added] divergence in competitiveness between the core and the so-called ‘periphery.’” Indeed it is, and, with monetary union meaning that the zone’s weaker members are unable to devalue themselves back into contention, any reversal of this process will be extraordinarily difficult, if not close to impossible. And, as things now stand, they may no longer even be given the opportunity to try.

Up until now the PIIGS (as S&P does not call them) have been able to manage their “underperformance . . . (manifest in sizeable external deficits) because of funding by the banking systems of the more competitive northern Eurozone economies.” That party is now over.

So what to do? S&P argues that “a greater pooling of fiscal resources and obligations as well as enhanced mutual budgetary oversight” could buoy confidence and cut the cost of borrowing for the euro zone’s weaker brethren. What these arrangements would look like is not spelled out. What they would not look like is the misshapen agreement that slunk out of Brussels in early December, a pact that S&P clearly views as too little, too vague, and too stingy.

Thus, the rating agency is understandably skeptical about whether plans to advance the start date of the €500 billion European Stability Mechanism (the permanent bailout fund designed to replace the existing €440 billion European Financial Stability Facility) by twelve months, to July 2012, will make much of a difference. Tactfully enough, S&P does not speculate whether its own downgrading of some of the countries that stand behind the ESM will make that almost certainly inadequate entity’s job even more trying. In case you wondered, it will. And in case there was any doubt about that, on January 16, S&P downgraded the EFSF.

Although it never comes out and directly says so, S&P seems to want today’s currency union to evolve into something far closer to the Brussels dream (and democratic nightmare), a fiscal union that would be the logical complement to a monetary union encompassing 17 different countries. Left unstated, but surely implicit, is that this process would be preceded by the firing of the long-awaited, effectively German-underwritten “bazooka,” the resort (however artfully described) to the monetary printing press on a scale thought (fingers crossed) to be sufficient to extinguish the euro’s growing fever. The fever is one thing, but curing the underlying disease -- the competitiveness chasm -- would be the work of generations (how long do you think it would take to build a Portugal that could keep pace with the Netherlands?), and would be an immense challenge to the social and political order in countries struggling to adapt to the theoretically admirable disciplines of a currency for which they are in fact very poorly suited.

Meanwhile, even if they can get past historic memories of what Weimar’s printing presses eventually led to, the prospect of paying for what will be, by any reasonable reckoning, a prolonged, expensive longshot is something that horrifies the taxpayers in Germany (and elsewhere in the euro zone’s north) who would be stumping up the cash. That’s why Angela Merkel, a trial-and-error politician at the best of times, will give every alternative approach a go before marching her country down a route that would enrage the electorate that is supposed to be reelecting her in 2013.

But no other alternative is likely to provide much relief for long. S&P warns that “a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone” may well prove self-defeating. However overdue they are, and however necessary they may be to sell the bailout parade to northern voters, austerity programs on the scale now being implemented in the PIIGS suck money, confidence, and demand out of their already battered economies. They shrink the tax base to such an extent that higher rates cannot compensate for falling revenues. Policies designed to cut deficits may actually end up increasing them. The PIIGS will have been chasing their own tails.

The markets understand this well. That’s why those PIIGS that can still tap the international markets have been finding it so expensive to do so. And that’s why there is such limited trust in a European banking system (already enfeebled by the 2008–09 financial debacle) that is, directly or indirectly, dangerously exposed to the woes of the euro zone’s laggards. And when there is limited trust in the banks, credit begins to freeze up. And when credit freezes, economies slow. And when economies slow, tax revenues decline. And when they do, bad deficits get worse. And, and, and . . .

If there’s one scrap of comfort to be found in S&P’s ruminations, it is in its observation that the European Central Bank has staved off “a collapse in market confidence” by a series of measures designed to prop up the EU’s banking system. Basically, the ECB has supplied Europe’s banks with large amounts of low-priced, comparatively lightly collateralized funding that, in December, grew to include €500 billion in three-year money -- and there will be more such bonanzas to come this year. That this may have left the ECB’s balance sheet looking like the books of an unusually generous pawnbroker is a problem, but it is a problem for another day.

All that money has bought some confidence, but not, unfortunately, a lot. Contrary probably to the hopes of the ECB, the banks have not been lured into using these cheap funds to “invest” in high-yielding government bonds issued by the likes of Italy. Instead the cash just piles up -- much of it, ironically, back at the ECB -- as nervous bankers wait for the crisis in which Angela Merkel is forced to choose between deploying the bazooka that saves the euro zone but destroys her career and (much, much less likely) abandoning the euro zone and taking a leap into the unknown.

That crisis will arrive. It could be triggered by Greece, which is teetering, as I write, on the edge of disorderly default, or maybe a spreading bank run will do the trick. There are plenty of possibilities to choose from. And that’s before the black swans come into view.

Clickety-click.

Naming the Crime

Timothy Snyder: Bloodlands - Europe Between Hitler and Stalin

National Review Online, March 18, 2011

Winter is bleak enough as it is. This year the gloom was deepened by the publication of How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism, by Eric Hobsbawm, one of Britain’s most feted historians, and, oh yes, a man who stuck with the Communist party until 1991 despite a global killing spree that took perhaps one hundred million lives. Naturally Hobsbawm’s new book has triggered the usual hosannas from the usual congregation for, to quote the Guardian, this “grand old man.”

There had, of course, been that minor unpleasantness back in the 1990s when Hobsbawm had appeared to imply that the deaths of 15 or 20 million people might have been justified had the Communist utopia actually been achieved. This ancient ogre (he is 93) is now more discreet. Reviewing How to Change the World in the Financial Times, Francis Wheen, no rightist and the author of an erudite and entertaining biography of Karl Marx, noted how Hobsbawm could not “bring himself to mention the Hitler-Stalin pact, referring only to ‘temporary episodes such as 1939–41.’ The Soviet invasion of Hungary and the crushing of the Prague Spring were [also] skipped over.”

But who are we to quibble, when, as his admirers like to remind us, Hobsbawm’s life has been “shaped by the struggle against fascism,” an excuse understandable in the 1930s (Hobsbawm, who is Jewish, quit Germany as a teenager in 1933), but grotesque more than six decades after the fall of the Third Reich.

Just how grotesque was highlighted by two books that came out last year. In the first, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, Yale history professor Timothy Snyder describes the darkness that engulfed a stretch of Eastern Europe in the mid-20th century. He leaves only one convincing response to the question that dominates the second, Stalin’s Genocides, by Stanford’s Norman Naimark: For all the unique evils of the Holocaust, was Stalin, no less than Hitler, guilty of genocide?

The first half of Professor Snyder’s grim saga revolves around the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33, a manufactured catastrophe in which zeal, malice and indifference conspired to create a horror in which, Snyder calculates, well over three million perished (there are other, much higher, estimates). It was, Snyder writes, “not food shortages but food distribution that killed millions in Soviet Ukraine, and it was Stalin who decided who was entitled to what.”

The Ukrainian countryside had already been devastated by collectivization and the killing, imprisonment, or exile of millions of its most enterprising inhabitants. Now it was to be stripped of what little it had left. The peasants were given targets for the amount of grain and other foodstuffs they were expected to hand over to the state, targets that would leave them with barely anything to live on, and often not even that. Refusal was not an option. Starvation was not an excuse. Nothing was left behind. Nobody was allowed to leave. The peasants were trapped. And they were condemned. In the spring of 1933 they died at the rate of more than ten thousand a day. “The only meat was human.”

That fall the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union.

Communism has brought mass starvation in its wake on a number of occasions (2010 also saw the appearance of Mao’s Great Famine,by Frank Dikötter, a harrowing account of the death of millions during the Chairman’s Great Leap Forward), but what distinguishes the Ukrainian Holodomor (a coinage that means murder by hunger) is that, as Snyder demonstrates, this particular famine was not just incidental to the business of fashioning utopia. It was deliberate, a weapon designed to break a class enemy, Ukraine’s embattled peasantry, and the battered nation of which it was the backbone.

It is this national element that some historians would like to deny. It unsettles the conventional narrative under which the ethnically based mass murders of mid-20th-century Europe are associated almost exclusively with Nazis, and, in so doing, it raises some awkward questions about those in the democratic world who looked so longingly to Moscow in the 1930s. The details of the Holodomor might have been obscure or obscured, but there was a fairly widespread awareness in the West that something had occurred. How else to explain all that talk of omelet and eggs? Those who claimed to have turned to Communism only because of the growing Nazi threat must have believed that those millions of dead Ukrainians counted for very little.

And it wasn’t just Ukrainians. As the Thirties curdled on, the list of peoples brutalized by Stalin grew ever longer. The “national operations” that were a murderous subset of the Great Terror of 1937–38 accounted for some 250,000 deaths, including those of at least 85,000 Soviet Poles. The hideous ethnic persecution developing in the Third Reich throughout the 1930s may have been more overt than its Soviet counterpart, but it was in the USSR that the cattle trucks were already rolling. At that stage Hitler’s haul of victims lagged far behind.

That was to change. The second part of Snyder’s book details how the Nazis brought their own flavor of hell to the territories he dubs the Bloodlands. With his feel for neglected history, Snyder restores focus to the terrible fate of the Soviet POWs who had fallen into German hands: “The Germans shot, on a conservative estimate, half a million Soviet prisoners of war. By way of starvation or mistreatment during transit, they killed about 2.6 million more.”

He correctly sees this not just as a matter of callousness and cruelty but as an adjunct to Hitler’s wider plans for a region that was to be emptied of most of its original inhabitants and re-peopled by the master race.

And then, of course, there were the Jews. In page after grueling page, Snyder depicts the pogrom that erupted across the Bloodlands. After all these years, after all the histories, there are still details that appall: “By spring 1943, fires burned at Treblinka day and night. . . . Women, with more fatty tissue, burned better than men; so the laborers learned to put them on the bottom of the pile.”

In an interesting twist, Snyder reveals how the usual Western understanding of the Holocaust, centered on the almost clinical danse macabre of deportation and eventual extermination in a camp far from Paris, Amsterdam, or Rome, fails to reflect the more typical experience to the east. The frenzied killings that swept the Bloodlands in the wake of the German invasion — within six months one million Soviet Jews had been butchered — are the clearest possible evidence of a primeval savagery unleashed.

To suggest, as some have, that, by twinning his chronicle of Nazi atrocity with a history of the Soviet slaughters of the previous decade, Snyder has in some way diminished the Holocaust is absurd. The Holocaust was underpinned by a dream of annihilation that was all its own, but it was also a product of its era. Like Communism, Nazism was a creed with a strong religious resonance (it’s no coincidence that this was a time when more conventional religions were losing their traditional hold over the human imagination), yet it aimed at creating a utopia for its elect here on earth, a dangerous enough delusion under the best of circumstances, let alone those developing in the early 20th century. For these utopias were, quite explicitly, to be built by bloodshed and sustained by force, a prospect made all the more menacing by technological advance, the growth of the modern state, and, critically, the shattering of so much of European civilization by the First World War. That conflict opened the door to the Bolshevik Revolution, which in turn helped pave the way for the Third Reich, a state that was both reaction against and imitation of the Soviet Union.

The Führer who, contemplating the Holocaust, once asked “who now remembers” the Armenian genocide. would certainly have noticed how quickly the Holodomor was allowed to vanish down the memory hole.

In some ways it is still there. That the Stalinist regime was guilty of what any reasonable person would describe as genocide has been beyond dispute for decades. Yet somehow there has been a hesitation about branding the Soviet state with the worst of the marks of Cain, a hesitation that still resonates — in politics, in diplomacy, and in high culture and low. Would there have been quite such an uproar if fashion designer John Galliano had said that he “loved” Stalin rather than Hitler?

In Stalin’s Genocides, Professor Naimark recounts how the definition of genocide was diluted before being enshrined in the 1948 United Nations convention. At the insistence of the Soviets — and others — the destruction of specific social and political groups was excluded. It was a distinction rooted neither in logic nor in morality, but it worked its sinister magic. Sparing Stalin, and by extension the state that he spawned, from the taint of genocide allowed the USSR to maintain some sort of hold over the radiant future that — against all the evidence — it still claimed to be building, that radiant future that has proved such a handy alibi for all the Hobsbawms and, even, for their successors today. It helped ensure that Mao’s famine too was largely passed over in silence. It still enables Russia to avoid the hard truths of its own history, an evasion that poisons its politics both at home and abroad. Sadly, it’s no surprise that the new pro-Moscow government in Ukraine has been playing down the genocidal nature of the Holodomor.

Since the Balkan wars, the jurisprudence of genocide has, as Professor Naimark shows, evolved to the point at which there could be no serious legal doubt that the architects of Soviet mass murder would, if hauled before a court today, receive the judgment they deserve. Prosecutions for the Soviet genocides have, however, been pitifully few and confined to the liberated Baltic states. Thus, in May 2008, one Arnold Meri was tried for his role in the deportation of 251 Estonians almost sixty years before. He died before a verdict could be reached. Not long later Dmitri Medvedev awarded Meri a posthumous medal for his wartime service.

And if you want just one reason why these books by Professors Snyder and Naimark are so important, that’s not a bad place to start. Hobsbawm you can junk.

Twentieth-Century Ghost

Metropolis

National Review Online, June 4, 2010 

To H. G. Wells, it was the “silliest film,” a “soupy whirlpool” and a “pretentious stew.” Yet on a Saturday night in Manhattan this May, 84 years after Metropolis was shot, the line to see Fritz Lang’s legendary sci-fi drama stretched halfway down the block. To be fair to Wells, the version of the movie he saw had been hacked down from an initial running time of 153 minutes to around an hour and a half in a counterproductive attempt to make its plot more comprehensible. He would probably not, however, have been much more impressed had he attended Metropolis’s January 1927 premiere. “The whole of Berlin” may have turned up to witness 153 minutes of a film intended to take German cinema to a whole new level, but by the end of those minutes much of Berlin was left thoroughly confused.

The managers of Germany’s UFA studios, the unfortunates who had spent nearly a year and a budget-busting 5 million reichsmarks (perhaps some $200 million today) on making Metropolis clearly knew that they had a problem on their hands even before their film was released and they marketed it as much as spectacle as cinema. A spread in the UFA magazine highlighted some of the movie’s vital (if not necessarily accurate) statistics: Seven hundred fifty children had, the publicists claimed, been used in the film’s making, along with “1,100 bald people, 100 Blacks, 25 Chinese, 3,500 pairs of shoes, 75 wigs” and, well, you get the picture. With 36,000 extras, how bad could Metropolis be? There was a tie-in novel by Lang’s wife, Thea von Harbou, that is, if anything, even more chaotic than the film, an overwrought mélange of pulp fiction, millennial raving, and begging-for-straitjacket hysteria that its author, at least, believed to have been art. Do not read it. I beg you.

UFA was not wrong. As story, Metropolis is a mess; as spectacle, it is superb, a glorious, oneiric depiction of a future urban dystopia (it’s set in 2026), part hive, part Manhattan, part megalopolis-of-the-future wow, and the inspiration for decades of cinematic cityscapes of not-yets to come, all the way from Just Imagine, a Depression-era musical comedy set in 1980, to Blade Runner, to the sadly underrated Dark City, to the sadly overrated Matrix trilogy. In a film where many characters fail to convince (the most striking exception to this is, tellingly, a robot), it is the city itself that is, like the Metropolis-influenced Gotham of the revived Batman franchise, the star.

But the future has a way of taking prophets by surprise. Within months of Metropolis’s opening, The Jazz Singer was released. This somewhat old-fashioned tale of a cantor’s son who performed in blackface heralded a technological change that was to drown out Lang’s suddenly dated depiction of modernity. Lang’s silent movie had been dumbed down overnight, its special effects eclipsed by the miracle of Vitaphone.

Metropolis faded from view. Its memory lingered, at least in cineaste lore, but the full breadth of Lang’s vision appeared to have vanished for good. All, it seemed, that remained was an abbreviation, a collection of truncated relics reasonably close to the bewildering 90 minutes of the international release. As for the rest, well, like the Weimar Berlin in which Metropolis had been filmed, it seemed to have been consigned to history.

Then something changed. As Europeans emerged from the devastation of 1939–45, the rebuilding of their ruined cities evolved into projects more ambitious than the hasty patchwork repair of the immediate post-war years. Historic town centers were painstakingly restored in an attempt to retrieve, reconnect, and sometimes reimagine the brutally shattered past. The same impulses can be detected in the reconstruction of Metropolis. It was an effort that gathered pace in the 1960s, and included a longer restoration put together by the East German state Film Archive (1968–72), disco guru Giorgio Moroder’s controversial 1984 appropriation  (shorter, but with color tinting and a classically 1980s soundtrack), and, after years of restoration work by Enno Patalas, the director of Munich’s film museum, the “Munich” Metropolis of 1987.

That’s not the end of the story. Using the Munich version as their core, and scrounging up every additional scrap of footage they could find, a team of restorers was able to assemble the “definitive” (124 minute) Metropolis issued in this country in 2002 on a fine DVD by Kino International. And that was meant to be that.

“Definitive” is a dangerous word. Six years after the Kino release, a 16mm copy of Lang’s epic was located in the archives of the film museum in, of all places, Buenos Aires. The footage was scratched, grubby, and the wrong size (16mm rather than 35mm), but it was as close to the original length as anyone could ever have hoped. Two years of restoration work followed as sections of the Argentine find were woven into the earlier definitive version filling in nearly all the missing links. Even after restoration, they are not perfect, but in their misty, messy way they are an evocative reminder of the time passed since the footage was shot and lost. The resulting patchwork—147 minutes long—comes as close to what was shown that long-ago night in Berlin as, probably, anything we are ever likely to see.

Fittingly enough, the new reunited Metropolis premiered earlier this year in the reunited Berlin that had too once seemed like an impossible dream. The movie arrived in the United States in April, debuting—where else—at Grauman’s Chinese Theatre. By May, it had made its way to New York City (the night I saw it, the film was introduced by the endearingly modest director of the Buenos Aires museum) and will, doubtless, once again become a regular on the art-house circuit. A DVD is not far behind.

Gaps have been filled, and subplots added. With the additions, the film makes a bit more sense than before. A bit. Metropolis remains a city where the economics fail (as Wells pointed out) to hang together, and its supposedly sophisticated machines are oddly clumsy, closer to treadmills than agents of production. Meanwhile, the Bildungsroman that lies at the movie’s heart, the awakening of the son of the city’s presiding genius to the injustice and oppression that are the essence of Metropolis, is muddied by apocalyptic mysticism, suggestions of magic, and a psychologically fraught love story involving the son, his father, his dead mother, a mad scientist, the holy Madonna-like Maria, and Futura, her disturbing “machine woman” robot doppelganger. The conclusion is as sappy as it is unconvincing, a sentimental submission to some sort of organic unity between all classes that helps explain why Goebbels was a fan (interestingly, Thea von Harbou later became a Nazi), but didn’t do much for me.

But not to worry—dazzlingly shot, frantically kinetic, and brilliantly edited, this is a film that can be enjoyed for its imagery alone, from the remarkable shots of Metropolis, to the portrayal of the flood that all but sweeps the city away, to the most famous sequence of all, the coming to life of the robot, a gorgeous deco goddess encircled by electric halos as she gradually assumes the form of the virginal Maria to become the whore—complete at one moment with Babylonian headgear—who will seduce the city into erotic and then self-destructive frenzy. Oh yes, a monk is also involved, and statues of the seven deadly sins come to life.

No wonder Wells, whose science-fiction vision was shortly to shift to an enlightened “air dictatorship” (Things to Come) run by clean-limbed flyboys in jackboots, disapproved, but then, for all its status as one of the first great sci-fi films, Metropolis was in reality something very different. It was not so much an anticipation of the future as a reflection of its own epoch. The greatest science-fiction movies, 2001, Blade Runner, the Soviet Solaris, are in many respects beyond their time — beyond any time. Any dates they include are there just for decoration. Not so with Metropolis. By setting the film in 2026, exactly a century after it was shot, Lang was guiding the audience back to their own time, an impression only reinforced by the costumes worn by the cast — and even the cars. “1926 models or earlier,” sniffed Wells. The notorious scenes shot in and around the Yoshiwara nightclub district conjure up images not of some 21st-century pleasure dome, but of the wicked delights of Weimar at its exuberant, brittle peak.

For Lang was making his movie during the brief interlude when it seemed as if Germany’s fragile democracy might survive, a fact that might have influenced the film’s message of reconciliation between the lower city’s (the proletariat lives a subterranean existence) crushed and regimented workers and those who — in all senses — lived above them. At the same time, to watch the sequences when the mob careens behind Maria/Futura, a pied piper bewitching them into a riot that can only lead to their doom, is to witness the anxieties of an era (less than ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution) all too conscious of where the failure to narrow too wide a gap between labor and capital might lead and, for that matter, of just how dangerously malleable the masses could be.

Within a few years, of course, Germany had found its pied piper, and the consequences of the lethal dance in which he led his people cannot help but shape how we view this film today. The horrors anticipated by Lang’s images of shaven-headed workers marching into the fiery maw of the machine-god Moloch are too obvious to need explanation, but the plight of the children trapped by the floodwaters rising in Metropolis’s underground city also seems like an uncanny foreshadowing of another tragedy, the fate of the thousands drowned when Hitler ordered the flooding of the Berlin subway system in April 1945. Even looking at the cast, one cannot help but wonder how many of those 36,000 extras, or the 750 children — in their twenties by the time of the war — were to perish in the course of Hitler’s rule, whether as victims, perpetrators, or, sometimes, both. As for Lang, Roman Catholic of partly Jewish descent, he rejected what he claimed was Goebbels’s invitation of a senior position within the Reich’s movie industry and decamped for France and thence to the United States and a second, Hollywood, career, leaving Metropolis behind him. It was lost, he later said.

But sometimes Atlantis can rise again.

What Is Going on in Blighty?

National Review Online, May 10, 2010

Britain’s election has left the country’s politics in a chaotic, confused mess. With the situation in such flux, there’s a decent chance that much of what I might write now (Sunday afternoon) will be obsolete by the time that you read it. So here instead are the answers to nine questions that should be relevant for some time. Well, a few days, anyway.

HOW DID THE VOTE GO?

To use an understatement: inconclusively. The House of Commons now has 650 MPs, so for one party to secure a majority, it needs to win 326 seats (in practice one or two fewer, but let’s not worry about that). For the first time since 1974, no one party has won that absolute majority. Parliament is “hung.” So far, the Conservatives have won 306 seats in the 2010 election and are forecast to win another after a special vote later this month, but it still won’t be enough. Labour came in second, with 258, and the Liberal Democrats third, with 57. With the exception of the eight sturdy Ulstermen of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist party, the remaining 28 seats (located in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and, in the case of Brighton — where a Green was elected — outer space) were mainly won by Celtic nationalists, few of whom have any time for the Tories. David William Donald Cameron has two Scottish names, but only one Tory MP in Scotland.

DID THE CONSERVATIVES BLOW IT?

Yes, if by less than some would claim. Thirteen years of Labour misrule capped by an economic and fiscal crisis ought to have paved the way for a solid Conservative victory. For most of 2008 and 2009, the opinion polls signaled that the Tories were set for an overall majority. Then something changed. In part this was the usual reversion of voters to their traditional voting habits in the run-up to a general election. And in part it was the fallout from a parliamentary expenses scandal that left the electorate disgusted by politicians of both the main parties. But there was something else. Looking at the support for David Cameron, it was striking how little enthusiasm for him there really was, even amongst the Tory faithful. To many voters, he came across as likable enough, even if he had a touch too much of the salesman about him, but that was it. In particular, he did not appear to be for anything worth getting excited about. I’ll go into the reasons for that in the answer to the next question, but let’s just note for now that in 2010 being Not-Labour was not quite enough.

But the word there is “quite.” Critics of David Cameron need to remember how far his party has come since the last election, in 2005, its third consecutive humiliating defeat. This time round, the Tories increased their tally of votes by 2 million, the same number by which their score exceeded Labour’s. They won more new seats than at any election since 1931, and they secured almost as big a swing against Labour as did Mrs. Thatcher in her legendary 1979 triumph. With 97 additional seats in the bag, the parliamentary party is roughly 50 percent larger than it was a week ago.

At the same time, the Conservative share of the popular vote only increased from a little over 32 percent to 36.1 percent. Financial crisis, broken borders, rising social disorder, and the peculiarities of that strange Gordon Brown ought to have been worth more than that.

WHAT DID THEY DO WRONG?

David Cameron took over a Conservative party that was, to put it bluntly, unelectable. Rightly or wrongly (in my view, wrongly) it was seen by many as the “nasty” party, not least thanks to the efforts and metropolitan prejudices of a media elite that is far more influential in Britain than are its counterparts in the United States. To tackle this, Cameron had to soften media hostility to a degree sufficient to enable his party to get its message out. He succeeded, but it meant dragging the Conservatives in an ostentatiously (to use the bleak newspeak) “inclusive” direction, a direction that (to be fair) at least partly reflected contemporary political attitudes amongst the wider population. Britain is no longer the Britain that elected Mrs. Thatcher.

Unfortunately, Cameron failed to realize he won the argument years ago. He had “decontaminated the brand,” and yet he went into the election still seemingly apologetic for it. He campaigned in 2010 as if it were 2007, afraid or unwilling to play those traditional Conservative tunes that — whatever they may say in Notting Hill — are still capable of pulling in the crowds. Instead, Cameron made clear that his faith in Al Gore’s gospel was undimmed by Climategate. He could barely bring himself to mention immigration, and his big vision was of a “Big Society” (I have no idea). Meanwhile, sending his most senior Europhile on a secret mission to Brussels added insult to the injuries of the Tories’ restless Euroskeptic core. In that context, it’s worth noting that Cameron’s lead at the polls started to decline almost immediately after he reneged late last year on a “cast iron” pledge to hold a referendum on the EU’s Lisbon treaty. This wasn’t an altogether unreasonable decision (the treaty had since come into effect, and would be extremely difficult to unscramble), but politically it was a serious mistake.

Perhaps this was simple miscalculation, the error of an out-of-touch individual surrounded by a small, like-minded clique. Perhaps. But there was another possibility: Had Cameron drunk too much of his own Kool-Aid? For the Tory leader to have changed his party’s course out of cynical political calculation is understandable; for him actually to believe the more obviously idiotic “progressive” nonsense he has been spouting would be unforgivable.

Either way, the base was unimpressed. In the most telling sign of this, over 900,000 people (roughly 3 percent of the popular vote, and an increase of 50 percent over 2005) voted for the euroskeptic UKIP, Britain’s fourth-largest party. To quote blogger Archbishop Cranmer, UKIP is a “lost tribe” of conservatism, made up of natural Tories whose politics are, to quote another blogger, the entertaining Guido Fawkes, those of the Conservative party “after a few gin and tonics.” Their votes may have cost the Tories as many as 20 seats, and thus a parliamentary majority. More than a few of those UKIP supporters might have returned to the Cameron fold had he been prepared to give them some sort of sign that he was, you know, just a little bit like them. Instead, he did the opposite.

IS THERE A LESSON FOR U.S. CONSERVATIVES?

When it comes to policy specifics, not so much. The U.K. is not the U.S. Its politics are very different (to start with, the British mainstream tends more to the center-left than is often understood over here). The challenge faced by David Cameron was very different from that now confronting the GOP. If there is one thing, perhaps, that Republicans could learn, it is this. Neither RINOs, nor the “reformers” of various hues, nor the various keepers of the conservative flame should drink too much of their different varieties of Kool-Aid. They should deal with the electorate as it is, not as they would like — or believe — it to be.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CLEGG?

Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third party, shot to prominence after a strong showing in the first televised party leaders’ debate. According to one opinion poll, “nice Nick” had become the most popular politician since Winston Churchill. He was articulate, a fresh face, and, briefly, “none of the above.” Unfortunately for Clegg, he was also a Liberal Democrat, and he was unable to carry his reliably unsuccessful party along on his coattails. The Liberal Democrats ended up losing a net five seats. Their 23 percent of the vote, slightly more than in 2005, was well below the high 20s (and more) recorded in the giddy days of early Cleggmania.

Despite that, the hung Parliament has left Nick Clegg in the game, busy being wooed by David Cameron and shouted at by Gordon Brown (it’s a tough-love thing).

HOW BAD ARE THE LIB-DEMS?

Pretty bad. The Liberal Democrats are usually described as left-of-center, and so they are, but that’s not the end of it. Nine decades out of office will leave any party looking a tad strange, and Clegg’s crew has proved no exception. Their ideology is a ragbag of policies, some good, some bad, some plain loopy, some well-intentioned, some not, the flotsam and jetsam of nearly a century of passing fads, prejudices, and dreams untouched by the realities of government. What does unite this somewhat fractious party, however, is a belief in electoral reform.

ELECTORAL REFORM?

British general elections operate on a strict “first past the post” basis. The candidate with the most votes in each constituency wins. Historically, this simplest of systems has been a force for political stability, generally producing governments with a majority large enough to govern by themselves for the whole of their term. Thus, Tony Blair’s Labour party won 55 percent of the parliamentary seats in 2005 with only 35 percent of the national vote.

This extreme, but not entirely untypical result was just the latest in a series bound to raise questions of fairness, questions that have been asked with mounting insistence in recent decades. The old system worked well enough when the two major parties carved up most of the vote between them, but in the multiparty Britain that has been evolving since the 1970s, it has come to look increasingly rough-hewn.

Crucially, first past the post squeezes a third party with appeal across much of Britain, but lacking the regional redoubt enjoyed, say, by the Scottish Nationalists. In short, it squeezes the Liberal Democrats. With 23 percent of the vote in 2010, they only won 9 percent of the seats. That’s why they are yet again calling for some move towards proportional representation as the price for their support. Labour is now desperate enough to make a move in that direction. For the Tories, it’s not so easy. Not only are there good practical arguments for preserving the current system, but also, a change to proportional representation would almost certainly mean that the Right would never rule Britain on its own again.

HAS HER MAJESTY BEEN MINDING THE STORE?

No, the constitutional position is that Gordon Brown continues to serve as prime minister (basically as a caretaker) until a replacement is found. It would take a vote of the newly elected House of Commons to force his government out of office, but Parliament is not due to sit until May 18.

AND THAT DEBT BUSINESS?

The renewed spasm of global financial uncertainty could hardly have come at a worse time. With a public-sector deficit at a Greek 12 percent of GDP, the United Kingdom is highly vulnerable to market panic. International investors have waited for months to see what steps Britain would take to reduce its deficit and when. Neither the Liberal Democrats, nor Labour, nor the Conservatives have come up with a convincing plan, but many market players seem to have taken the view that such discretion was inevitable in a closely fought electoral contest. They appeared to have been reassured by the thought that the Tories would prevail and that somehow “something” would be done. That comforting illusion has now been dispelled. However you parse the election results, there was no majority for spending cuts on the scale that will be needed, and with another election almost certainly in the offing who now will be prepared to suggest them?

Hang onto your hats.

Swiss, Cross

National Review Online, December 10, 2009

So far, so predictable. The now infamous referendum amending Switzerland’s constitution in a way that prohibits the construction of any more minarets in the land of Heidi (there are already, um, four) has been damned by the usual suspects, including a gaggle of Christian clergymen, a babble of media, crazy Colonel Qaddafi, Turkey’s thuggish Islamist prime minister (the one who once referred to minarets as “our bayonets”), Iran’s thuggish Islamist foreign minister, Egypt’s Grand Mufti (try building a new church in Egypt), a collection of Saudi “scholars” (don’t even think of building a church in Saudi Arabia), and, of course, Jon Stewart.

Yes, yes, I know what you are thinking, but condemnation by these clowns is not by itself a reason to decide that the vote went the right way — or that holding the referendum was a particularly good idea in the first place. It’s a start, however.

It is important to realize what the referendum was — and what it was not. What it was not was an assault on the ability of Switzerland’s 400,000 Muslims (roughly 5 percent of the population) to practice their religion. Their ability to worship freely is untouched, and they can build all the mosques they want — so long as they are not adorned with minarets.

But it is not unusual to find mosques without minarets, especially outside historically Muslim territories. Thus Switzerland has 150 to 200 mosques or public prayer rooms, but only those four lonely minarets, none of which — thanks to noise-pollution regulations — are actually used for the adhan, the call to prayer. Those numbers suggest that this vote is no threat to anybody’s freedom of religion. They also suggest that minarets are no threat to the freedom of the Swiss to be Swiss, but this is to miss the point. The referendum was always about more than a few towers. Voters took aim at the minarets as a way of venting their fears about militant Islam and, more generally, their unease at the ways in which their country has been — and is being — changed by high levels of immigration. The latter is a factor that should not be underestimated. Despite playing host to various international organizations, numerous banks, and countless tourists, Switzerland is at its core still a conservative, somewhat insular place, comfortable in its own skin and more than a little suspicious of outsiders. There’s a reason why the Swiss joined the U.N. (the fools!) only in 2002, and wisely continue to stay outside the EU.

The trouble is that fear and unease make bad legislators. The effect of the new rules may be mainly symbolic, but symbolism can kick both ways. It’s no great stretch to suspect that the consequences of this vote will be counterproductive. Switzerland’s Muslims, who mostly hail from the Balkans or Turkey, are a largely moderate, secularized bunch. Unfortunately, the result of the referendum — along with some of the ugly rhetoric that preceded the vote — risks changing these peoples’ sense of their own identity. There’s a danger that they will come to view themselves as primarily defined by their common religious background rather than by their very different ethnic and cultural heritages or, for that matter, their hopes of a thoroughly Swiss future. Banning the minarets may fill the mosques.

There’s also a clear risk that what is preached in those mosques will lurch in a more extreme direction. This would be a natural response to the sense of siege and resentment that the vote may create, particularly if that resentment is fanned by money and ideas from Middle Eastern sources keen to stiffen the resolve of co-religionists toiling in the land of the wicked, oppressive kuffār.

Rather than spending their time in architectural micromanagement, it would be far smarter for the Swiss to increase their efforts to integrate the Muslims in their midst, and to do so in a way that creates no special spaces, privileges (other, perhaps, than the extension to Islam of the “official” status enjoyed by other religious denominations in many cantons), or obstacles for their religion. No religion should be fenced off from the hurly-burly of debate, criticism, and ridicule. The fear of giving (dread word) “offense” should not be allowed to trump free expression. That would be true in the case of any creed, but it’s particularly true of Islam, a muscular faith with little room for clear dividing lines between mosque and state. Muslims should be free to practice their religion in Switzerland, but Islam must be made to take its chances in the rough-and-tumble marketplace of ideologies essential to any open society, and to do so within democratic constraints.

You’d think that this would be an obvious, even superfluous, argument to make, but in today’s Western Europe — hogtied by the exquisite sensitivities and repressive legislation that are the hallmarks of multiculturalism — that is no longer the case. One of the most telling moments in the referendum campaign came after the appearance of a controversial — and brilliantly designed — poster in which missile-like minarets pierced the Swiss flag, and a woman clad in abaya and niqab stared out with an oddly come-hither look in her eyes. Overstated? Certainly. Harsh? Certainly. Nevertheless, in a properly functioning liberal democracy, those who disagreed with the poster would have tried to dispel its message with the force of their arguments, not the force of law. Some did. Others preferred coercion.

The poster was banned in, to name but a few places with a thing against free speech, Lausanne, Fribourg, Basel, and Neuchâtel, in a spasm of censorship that, as much as anything else, demonstrates why so many Swiss have rallied behind the SVP (the Swiss People’s Party), a distinctly rough-edged party of the populist Right that is now the largest political grouping in Switzerland (it won some 29 percent of the vote in the 2007 elections) and was the principal driving force behind the referendum. To its discredit, the SVP has more than a touch of the bully about it, with, for example, a disturbing weakness for rhetoric that is as much anti-immigrant as it is anti-immigration. Sadly, that has only added to its appeal. But a large number of more moderate voters have found that they too have been left with nowhere else to turn but the SVP, a phenomenon echoed in the rise elsewhere in Western Europe of parties prepared to stray beyond the spectrum of conventional opinion.

It’s revealing that the referendum’s results came as such a nasty surprise to those who make up Switzerland’s traditional political establishment. Their shock was an embarrassing reminder of how out of touch they have become. And no, the result was not a simple matter of Left versus Right, of hick versus sophisticate. Not only did a striking 57.5 percent of those who voted favor the minaret ban, but the ban won support across the country, including, predictably enough, the heartlands of the Schwiizertüütsch, but far beyond too.

In the end, however flawed the referendum’s focus, there was something impressive about the way voters chose to defy the wishes of those who supposedly knew better. The government opposed the measure, as did a clear majority in the federal parliament, but (such are the joys of the Swiss system) there was nothing these politicians could do to block a referendum once 100,000 citizens had formally endorsed the call for a vote. And there was little, it turned out, that they could do to influence the way the vote went. The Swiss took their decision on November 29. The timing was almost perfect. Just two days later, the Lisbon Treaty (the European Union’s constitution in all but name) came into force. The latter was a triumph for the Brussels oligarchy, a win for deception, double-dealing, and the sidestepping of electorates. The former was a victory for a straightforward, bottom-up form of democracy that is the antithesis of everything for which the EU stands.

That contrast explains why the Swiss elite has become so keen that Switzerland should sign up for the EU, a political structure deliberately designed to replace the inconveniences of popular sovereignty with the smoothness — for those on the inside — of technocratic rule. If the Swiss had been members of Brussels’s unlovely union, it is highly unlikely that their referendum would have gotten as far as it did, and it is almost completely inconceivable that its results would be able to survive review by the EU’s rampaging judiciary. As it is, the voters’ decision is likely to face legal challenges arising out of other provisions in the Swiss constitution, not to speak of those flowing from the country’s international treaty obligations.

The fact remains, however, that there has indeed been a point to this once seemingly pointless referendum. Swiss voters may have exaggerated fears of the Islamic problem that they face now (the future is a different matter), but they have taken the opportunity offered by a stupid question to give a sensible answer to the political class. Their message was clear. Switzerland must have nothing more to do with the multicultural politics and misguided immigration policies that have done so much to contribute to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere in Western Europe.

It’s worth noting that such a change of tack would not be possible were Switzerland to join the EU. More critically still, it would be difficult to reconcile with the existing arrangements that govern the free movement of workers between Switzerland and the EU, not that that fact would worry the SVP overmuch. The party would relish a punchup with Brussels.

What’s tricky is that most Swiss do not yet appear to feel the same way. They have backed the free-movement agreements (and then their extension) in a total of three referenda since 2000, the most recent earlier this year. With the EU’s elites opposed to putting their own house in order (and unwilling to offer their own increasingly discontented electorates the sort of say available to voters in Switzerland), the SVP’s leaders know how vital it is for the Swiss to restore absolute control over their own borders, but for most of their countrymen this remains a step too far. It is so much easier to grumble about minarets.

It is probable, therefore, that the next stages in this drama will remain rooted in the symbolic. A leading member of the SVP has announced that forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and the wearing of the burqa in public are all problems that need to be addressed. That’s certainly fair enough (and the SVP is not the only party to think so), even if some other areas of concern for the party (such as the existence of separate Muslim cemeteries) reveal that it has not lost its taste for provocation and overreach. Ultimately, however, these are all peripheral topics when compared to the more basic question of immigration. Indeed, they can be seen as a soft substitute for tough action in that field, something that remains unlikely for now.

But it will be interesting to see how the Swiss react if the European Court of Human Rights (its judgments are binding on all members of the Council of Europe, a grouping that is larger than the EU, and that includes Switzerland) tries to ban the minaret ban.

Sometimes a nation — if it is to remain a nation — just has to go it alone.

The Borgomeister

Nosferatu the Vampyre

National Review Online, October 30, 2009

There’s a long, unrespectable tradition of vampires’ being unable to decide whether we humans are lunch, lovers, or a bite of both. My irritation at coming across a pile of Twilights and their no-less-sensitive kin heaped under the heading “undying love” in a neighborhood Barnes & Noble was thus curmudgeonly and somewhat unfair. For those who can understand my reaction (well, you are reading NRO, so you just might), and are themselves getting a little sick of the simpering-emo-tofu undead, here’s a recommendation: This weekend, celebrate both Halloween and the 30th anniversary of the release of the finest — and grandest — vampire movie of them all by watching Nosferatu the Vampyre. It’s a 1979 film by the German director Werner Herzog that transforms genre into art and an old story into something new. It never goes near a high school and rarely goes bump in the night.

Blood is sucked, not shed, there’s no gore, and there’s none of the ripping and tearing so characteristic of another type of modern vampire, those ill-bred ones oafs who choose to adopt the revolting table manners of their loutish zombie counterparts. (If you saw 30 Days of Night, you know what I mean.) The sentiments that run through Herzog’s film owe nothing to either psychotic rage or prom-night angst, but a great deal to German Romanticism, ancient profound weariness, exhausted fatalism, and hysteria — complete with a grotesquely parodied danse macabre--in the face of onrushing death. Naturally there’s also a moment of supremely noble, erotically charged self-sacrifice. Inevitably it is pointless. Yes, Nosferatu is a German film, a very German film.

Shot in Holland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and, in its eerie opening sequence, Mexico, Herzog’s film, which was made on a budget — under $1 million — almost as incredible as its subject matter, is a slow, stately, hallucinatory, unexpectedly lavish, unexpectedly lovely “free version” of the first filmed Nosferatu (1922’s Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens, Friedrich Murnau’s German expressionist masterpiece).

Owing to his studio’s failure to secure the rights to Bram Stoker’s then-still-within-copyright classic, Murnau’s movie was itself something of a reinterpretation. The count lost all his hair and all his wives but gained long, claw-like fingernails, the B-movie-alien name of Orlok, and a face that was part bat, part rat, and all ugly. Unlike Dracula, Orlok’s bite lacked even the gift of twisted immortality: It was permanently fatal to others and, in what was to become a familiar addition to vampire lore, sunlight was fatal to him. Additionally, some of Stoker’s characters were edited out or jumbled around, and the narrative was shifted in time (to the 1830s from the 1890s) and place (from England to the fictional Wisborg, a blend of Wismar and Lübeck, in north Germany).

These changes were not enough. The widow Stoker successfully sued the studio (which promptly went bankrupt), and all prints of the film were ordered destroyed. By then, however, copies had already circulated across the world. The film lived on, legendary, indestructible, and illicit, ready to reappear in the form of Herzog’s allusive, elusive, and dreamlike reworking.

In Herzog’s view, Murnau’s Nosferatu is the greatest German movie ever shot. Remaking it was his attempt to reconnect with an earlier generation of German filmmakers, the “grandfathers” untainted by the Third Reich (Murnau died two years before Hitler rose to power), and, through them, to an older, better national cultural heritage. Herzog may have borrowed much of Murnau’s storyline, but the earlier Nosferatu was merely a starting point for what the later director was trying to achieve. To be sure, some of Herzog’s shots are almost exact recreations of Murnau’s, and there are instances when the modern cast adopts the mannered acting style of Weimar expressionism, but the later film has a grandeur almost entirely missing from the slightly crabbed original.

Herzog’s Dracula (“Orlok” could now be safely dispensed with) may resemble Murnau’s in his loathsome appearance, but (as played by a mesmerizing Klaus Kinski) he is a predator — not vermin, never remotely a hero, but an oddly tragic figure nonetheless: “Time is an abyss a thousand nights deep. Centuries come and go. To be unable to grow old is terrible. . . . Can you imagine enduring centuries, experiencing the same futility each day?”

Herzog’s Nosferatu is, in its very specifically German way, a highly romantic film. Defined by an extraordinarily beautiful cinematography, much of it of mountain, mist, forest, and waterfall (Herzog hails from Alpine Bavaria), it is frequently reminiscent of nothing so much as the vast, visionary landscapes of Caspar David Friedrich, the leading artist in Germany’s 19th-century Romantic movement, even as its eerie, not-quite-right grays pay tribute to Stoker’s own swirling imagery:

Everything is grey — except the green grass, which seems like emerald amongst it; grey earthy rock; grey clouds, tinged with the sunburst at the far edge, hang over the grey sea, into which the sand-points stretch like grey fingers. The sea is tumbling in over the shallows and the sandy flats with a roar, muffled in the sea-mists drifting inland. The horizon is lost in a grey mist. All is vastness; the clouds are piled up like giant rocks, and there is a “brool” over the sea that sounds like some presage of doom.

Yet Herzog is too smart to believe that history’s dark ghosts can be kept at bay for long. When Jonathan Harker (nicely played by Bruno Ganz, a gifted actor best known in the United States, ironically under the circumstances, as Adolf Hitler in Downfall) makes his way through the thin space of the Borgo Pass into the nightmare that lies beyond, he does so to the cascading, tumbling prelude to Wagner’s Das Rheingold. It’s a choice that appears designed to extricate the composer from the clammy adoration of his most notorious fan, but it cannot help reminding us that Wagner’s work was the musical accompaniment to a people’s descent into a pagan intoxication — an intoxication that was in many respects an extreme, perverse expression of the German Romantic tradition that Herzog so loves.

It’s equally worth noting that before she turned to Nazi propaganda, Leni Riefenstahl, the most infamous exemplar of the film-making generation Herzog wished to bypass, was best known for starring in Bergfilme (mountain films), a typically German genre in which the mountainous landscape was as much a star as the actors and that finds some strong echoes in Nosferatu. Riefenstahl’s debut as a director was a mountain film named The Blue Light. The next movie she directed was Triumph of the Will. It is, it seems, almost impossible to return to the roots of Germany’s cultural heritage without acknowledging the evil shapes into which they were to grow.

So it’s perhaps fitting that the consequences of that evil resonate in the very locations where Herzog’s movie was shot. The sequences filmed in then-Communist Czechoslovakia were a reminder of an Eastern Europe torn apart and cut off by the catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s. In 1979, this region seemed irrevocably lost as, in a different way, so much of the Lübeck and Wismar of Murnau’s Nosferatu were; many of those cities’ centuries-old buildings had been devastated by Allied bombing and, in Wismar’s case, the malice of the East German state. Despite one notable sequence featuring the same row of Lübeck buildings that Murnau had, Herzog’s Wismar (he dropped the idea of “Wisborg”) was largely represented by the Dutch city of Delft — gorgeous, intact, and, by its very architectural survival, a pointed comment on all that Germany had lost.

But destruction isn’t only physical. When Dracula brings an army of rats (Herzog imported 11,000 of them from Hungary, painting each of them gray) and, with them, plague, into Wismar, its buildings endure as the city empties out. Among the most striking characteristics of Herzog’s Nosferatu is the way the director uses images of great beauty to tell a story of great horror. This is never more so than in the film’s depiction of Wismar’s losing its elegance as its people lose their lives; the shreds of their civilization are shown unraveling in astounding, merciless sequences of ravishing desolation.

Up until and including its finale — a glimpse of apocalypse complete with a pale rider disappearing into an immense horizon of sand and cloud — Nosferatu is saturated with a sense of impending, relentless doom. The atmospheric and impeccably chosen soundtrack features a repeating motif redolent of a death knell, while the film’s heroine, Lucy (a marvelous Isabelle Adjani in a role closer to that of Stoker’s Mina) has a pallor that hints at the grave. Her languor is echoed by almost all the rest of the cast in a series of subdued, sotto performances that underpin the sense of helpless, hopeless melancholy that persists throughout the movie.

Even Dracula himself is soft-spoken, his words slow, deliberate, and almost hesitant, his voice sometimes caressing, sometimes menacing, and always weary. He comes across as an exhausted figure, still powerful, yes, but tired of his own power. He is at the crossroads of human, demon, animal, and even insect, but he is still painfully conscious of the traces of humanity within him; he is alienated, isolated, lonely, envious, and resentful. Check out the scene in a night-struck Wismar where Dracula (illuminated an almost electric blue) peers through a window that reveals a cozy, candle-lit domestic scene: Satan gazing at a Vermeer interior, and mourning, and wanting and craving. To watch Kinski’s evocative face for just those few moments is to understand how the loneliness that envelops Dracula will lead this iron-willed predator into vulnerability and danger, and to watch Kinski in this role is also to be rewarded with the sight of one legend playing, and transforming, another. If Lugosi is operetta, Kinski is opera.

And best enjoyed, I think, with a little . . . wine.

Playing the Joker

National Review Online, August 18, 2009

If the right to vote (or not vote) for our leaders is a sign of a healthy democracy, so is the right not just to criticize, but also to insult them. Jeering, heckling, and rude, impious laughter are no less a part of the democratic process than the force-fed ecstasy of a party convention, the cheers of the shining-eyed faithful, or the complacent applause at rubber-chicken dinners. A statement of the obvious? You’d think so, but judging by some of the more overwrought reactions to a new and notably unflattering portrait of President Obama, some of his supporters need to relearn how to live with an American way of debate that is vigorous, rarely sedate, and often distinctly rough about the edges. That is not to say that this depiction of the president does not raise some troubling issues of its own — part of its force, unfortunately, if probably inadvertently, derives from the fact that it does — but those issues are, on balance, rather less disturbing than the near-hysterical response of a number of those who claim to be offended by it, reactions that suggest that too many of Obama’s disciples still believe their god-king should be allowed to float, untroubled and undisturbed, above the hurly-burly that the rest of us call politics.

The offending image, as most Americans know by now, is a photograph of Obama manipulated into an approximation of Heath Ledger’s Joker character in The Dark Knight. Its origins remain somewhat obscure, but it appears to have been based on an earlier photoshopped Obama-as-Joker created by a Chicago student. That image was not apparently a reflection of its creator’s political views (and was subsequently removed from his Flickr page). The same cannot be said of the new version. Joker-Obama has been given a blue background and a red frame. These colors combine with a chalk-white face and red slash of mouth to conjure up a harsh, scornful retort to the serene red, white, and blue of the legendary “Hope” by Shepard Fairey that did so much to shape and enhance Obama’s electoral magic.

When comparing these two clashing portrayals, we notice that in Fairey’s poster Obama’s mouth is set, serious, determined, while Joker-Obama’s is transformed into a hideous, thoroughly unconvincing smile, a smile made even more disconcerting by the subject’s staring panda eyes. His face, like that of the movie character on which it is based, is that of a madman. Fairey’s Obama by contrast is a saint, a visionary, a leader, his eyes peering out at the radiant future into which, no doubt, he intends to take us, a future summed up in only two words (first “hope” and later “change,” or was it the other way round?) that can be both noun and commanding verb, but are as empty of real meaning as the “socialism” with which the anonymous artist behind Joker-Obama captioned his creation.

Posters of Joker-Obama first appeared a month or so ago, before going viral and becoming the first anti-Obama artifact to attract a mass following in a country still littered with adoring Obamabilia. In a sense, therefore, this brutal little portrait has already done its work. The icon is chipped. A sharp, disrespectful cackle has interrupted the self-satisfied chorus of agreement with which Obama’s skillfully teleprompted sermons are usually received, a cackle made even more dangerous to the administration by the fact that mounting public skepticism over some of the Democrats’ initiatives has, for the first time since the election, created an opening that even the stumblebum GOP might manage to exploit. It is this (as much as any sense of lèse-majesté, although there is that too) that helps explain some of the outrage that this one image has generated, a tantrum rendered grimly amusing by still-fresh memories of the silence, or even approval, with which so many Democrats greeted the cruel renderings (including, naturally, one as the Joker from, naturally, Vanity Fair) of George W. Bush that scarred the political landscape throughout his term in office.

To be fair, some of those who object to Joker-Obama have attempted to clothe their complaints in something more substantive than “You can’t do that to our guy.” The word “socialism” is inaccurate, they grumble, and to the extent that the Democrats do not appear intent on reviving the spirit of Upton Sinclair they are quite right. On the other hand, we live in 2009, and the bundle of resentments, superstitions, and aspirations once dubbed socialism have evolved into a protean collection of ideas that don’t fit comfortably with traditional notions of what that antique ideological label should mean. Who needs common ownership of the means of production? With growing government intervention in the economy (even excluding the current emergency arrangements), in your pocketbook, and in the more general ordering of society, there are worse ways to describe the direction in which this country is sliding. “Socialism” may not be the most precise, the most carefully calibrated, professorially approved term to use, but as shorthand for the understandable fear that a remodeled leftist leviathan is stirring, it will do.

Others have tut-tutted that using the Joker in this fashion makes no sense because (a) the Joker isn’t a socialist and (b) President Obama is not a raving homicidal maniac — criticisms that may suggest that the literalists are now running the asylum. We are after all talking about a caricature. We can, I think, agree that — despite persistent rumors of his earlier involvement in the Biden campaign — the Joker is not even a Democrat, let alone a socialist (he is more of a nihilist, I suppose). Equally, I hope that even the most rabid of those of us on the right can admit that Obama — while not so preternaturally calm as frequently asserted — is very far from being a raving homicidal maniac. We ought also to be able to agree that using the Joker to deface (in two senses of the word) a picture of Obama was, sit down please, a joke — a pointed joke, sure, a nasty joke, maybe, but a joke nonetheless. There’s nothing much to parse here, folks, just move along.

And yet that grotesque image has made more of an impact than might have been expected. Perhaps it’s just because it represents a chance at last — after months of generally worshipful media coverage — to protest and, better, to make fun of our sainted president. And maybe it does come with a certain crude logic. You can at least make a case that the Joker is an agent of chaos, and that Joker-Obama thus taps into fears that chaos (hyperinflation, say) will soon be with us if the Democrats’ policies continue in their present direction. Maybe. But the best bet is that the real power of Joker-Obama is as a mask, a device that plays to the anxiety of many Americans (an anxiety so strong in some cases that it has given birth to the Birthers) that they do not know who Obama is, an anxiety that is the not altogether surprising consequence of his rapid rise, guarded personality, deceptive governing style, and — it’s a shame that this should be perceived as relevant, but it apparently is — an upbringing and ethnic background that differ sharply from what was once considered the American norm.

That last aspect brings us to the regrettably inevitable question as to whether the poster is any way racist. Of course, the manner in which elements in the Obama claque attempt to shut down debate by blaming (it sometimes seems) almost any criticism of the president on racism has become a cliché of contemporary American politics. And in that respect, the reaction to Joker-Obama has not disappointed. Blogging for LA Weekly, Steven Mikulan claimed “the only thing missing” from the poster “is a noose.” Over at the Washington Post, culture critic Philip Kennicott tied himself up in knots as he tried to demonstrate that applying the “urban” make-up of Heath Ledger’s Joker to Obama (rather than that of Jack Nicholson’s supposedly more “urbane” take) was a “subtly coded, highly effective racial and political argument,” an attempt to assert that “Obama, like the Joker and like the racial stereotype of the black man, carries within him an unknowable, volatile and dangerous marker of urban violence, which could erupt at any time.”

Ridiculous, yup, but just because most such allegations of racism are ludicrous, that does not mean that all are. There is something — the whiteface — about Joker-Obama that means this poster is not a banner under which the opposition to the president should rally. To be sure, “clown white” (to use the technical term) makeup is an essential element in the appearance of Batman’s archenemy: it’s impossible to transform anybody — whether George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, or Barack Obama — into the Joker without it. Nevertheless, even if (as I would guess) the Joker-Obama poster was created without any racist intent, it can still be read in a way that resonates very uncomfortably indeed. However much we might want to, we can wish away neither the uglier parts of history nor their continuing echoes. As a result, therefore, and regardless of the intention behind it, giving Obama the Joker’s stark white skin tone takes what would (in the case of Bush and Clinton) be simple caricature dangerously close to the badlands of minstrelsy.

Of course, most (though not all) minstrel shows featured whites in blackface rather than the other way round, but a key theme that lurked within almost all of them was the use of, to adopt a clumsy phrase, racial cross-dressing to mock and belittle black people. It’s the memory, however vague, however buried, of this, I suspect, that has contributed to both the poster’s offensiveness (to some) and, sadly, its appeal (to others). Yes, About.com (owned by the New York Times!) is, at the time of writing, running a picture of RNC chairman Michael Steele made up to look like a clown, but when I look at it all I see is a depiction of a man (who happens to be African-American) portrayed as a clown. The far more disturbing Joker-Obama is something else. Unlike Steele’s sleek clown, we are shown an unhinged, sinister trickster, with make-up that is not so much costume as (rather poorly executed) camouflage, a disguise that can at least conceivably be interpreted as a suggestion that Obama could not have been elected if he had revealed, so to speak, his true colors, a suggestion that in its most literal sense is deeply demeaning to African-Americans.

Stretching too hard, perhaps, overly “sensitive,” possibly, but both America’s troubled racial history and the current febrile state of our politics call for caution in this area — and so does clear-eyed political calculation of what it will take to beat Obama in 2012. Playing the Joker just isn’t the way to go.

Destination Moon

National Review Online, July 17, 2009

Apollo_11_BBC_Studio

I don’t know where I was when I heard that JFK had been shot, but I can remember where I was at teatime the following day — at home in the east of England, watching the very first episode of Doctor Who. It was the halting, creakily paced beginning of a long, beguiling tumble through time and space that, in the absence of any proper space program of our own, became an eccentric and quintessentially English alternative to Gemini, Apollo, and footsteps on the moon.

Not for the first time, we had sweetened our failure with fantasy. NASA’s Mission Control may have been the acme of American industrial cool, a collection of (Alfred) Sloan Rangers, calm, crew-cut men in white shirts methodically guiding tiny vessels over immense distances, but we had Doctor Who, an almost-perfect embodiment of the chaotic, improvisational genius that Brits like to believe is one of their better national characteristics. The doctor generally appeared to have little control and less interest over where or when his spacecraft might land — but wherever and whenever it was, and whatever the perils he encountered there, he invariably managed to emerge victorious at the end. To be sure, he was an alien from another world, but he was a very British alien, amateurish, surprisingly effective, and clad in vaguely Edwardian clothing, a wistful nod to a lost empire’s last good time.

Yes, the fact that the Union Jack would never preside over some far lunar crater was a disappointment to a nation still proud of its explorers of old, but it was with a certain sardonic, stoic grace that this once-great power came to terms with its role as a space-race spectator and concluded that it performed that role rather well. In addition, the world famous Jodrell Bank Observatory was, Britons told themselves, an essential element in man’s thrust into the unknown, a listening post that provided the Americans with invaluable assistance, not least in eavesdropping on the intriguing Soviet spacecraft that sailed through the heavens. These vehicles were shrouded in mystery and lies, yet were quite capable of delivering a series of spectacular achievements — the first orbit by an artificial satellite, the first man in space, the first space walk, the first successful soft landing of a probe on the moon.

To tell the truth, we were able to take more pleasure in those Soviet triumphs than were our cousins across the Atlantic. Naturally, we were more or less on the side of the Yanks, our allies, “family,” and, don’t say it too loudly, heirs, but we had a touch more room for the idea that the us-versus-them that counted most was man against the dangers of the universe, not man against man.

When, in August 1961, four months or so after his pioneering orbit around the Earth, Yuri Gagarin visited the British capital, the London Times sniffed that he had “received a welcome that sometimes bordered on hysteria” (this was before Beatlemania). At just three years old, I was a part of the frenzy. My parents, no stooges of the Kremlin, decided it was “important” that I was taken to stare at the Soviet spaceman. Sadly, I have no memory of this historic event, but I like to believe that it played a part in triggering my lifelong fascination with what might lie out there among the stars, a fascination only partly attributable to my subsequent abduction by aliens (well, you never know), a fascination rocket-powered throughout my boyhood by the way that science fiction and science fact played off each other in that first great age of space exploration, an era that promised, or so it seemed, to make a reality of the wonders already foretold by Asimov, Clarke, and the best of the rest of the paperback seers.

And as the decade progressed, each new program — Gemini, Apollo, Vostok, Voskhod, Soyuz — seemed to bring that reality ever closer, especially when it became clear that man was at last on the threshold of a visit to his planet's nearest neighbor. By the late summer of 1968, the finish line was coming into view. September saw the Soviet Zond 5 become the first vessel to circle the moon and return safely to earth — complete with a cargo of worms, flies, and a turtle or two. America countered with a sharp ratchet-up of the evolutionary scale, dispatching Apollo 7 into orbit in October, the first successful manned Apollo mission.

That, thought NASA, was practice enough. It had to be. Nobody knew what the Soviets might try next. In December, Apollo 8 headed for the moon — and possibly the most magical Christmas since Charles Dickens first published his tale of Ebenezer, ghosts, and redemption. Britain was enthralled. The moon made stars of science correspondents such as the dignified Peter Fairley from ITV (then the UK’s sole private television network) and the boyishly enthusiastic James Burke of the BBC, and gave an extra boost to the career of Patrick Moore, the marvelously oddball host of The Sky at Night, a show the BBC has operated as a vespers for insomniac astronomers since, astonishingly, 1957 — with Patrick, these days Sir Patrick, Moore always in charge. As for me, in between painstakingly monitoring developments on the telly and painstakingly boring everyone I knew with my command of mission minutiae, I pored over diagrams from the newspapers showing Apollo 8’s tricky trajectory (suitably enough, it resembled a figure eight) and preparing for the tense vigil for to come once Anders, Lovell, and Borman first disappeared behind the dark side of the moon.

Then 1968 evolved into 1969, and Apollo 8 into Apollo 9 and from that into the dress rehearsal that was Apollo 10. The Soviet program ran into difficulties, leaving history to Armstrong, Aldrin, and Collins — and the future to the rest of us. Looking at the diary I kept that year, I can see that I had marked out the projected date — July 16 — for the launch (“US MOON SHOT OFF TODAY”) of Apollo 11 some time before the momentous day itself actually dawned. This launch was something to count the days to, a grand historical happening to which the later entry in my diary didn’t do much justice: “It took off successfully.” True enough, but not enough. I gazed that day delighted and agog at television pictures of the giant rocket rising majestically into a sky then unscarred by memories of the Challenger.

Eventually Apollo 11 vanished from my sight — but not from my mind. Obsessed by thoughts of the moon landing ahead (at last!) and where it might lead (Mars!), I stalked that spacecraft over the next few days. Nothing must go wrong! TV’s designated experts did what they could to explain what was going on, helped by the models and the charts that were the best — not bad — that British television could come up with in a primitive time long before CGI. But it could never be enough: I needed to know more. I scrutinized footage of the three astronauts. How were they doing? Were they okay? I checked out cavernous, disciplined Mission Control for clues. Was all well? Who looked nervous? Between the beeps that became part of Apollo’s soundtrack, I strained to make sense of those exotic, evocative communications between Houston and spaceship that NASA chose to relay to us back “home,” a word itself now given a larger meaning than ever before.

The night of July 20 found me allowed to stay up way past my bedtime and sip from a glass of, strangely, cherry brandy (a sickly drink then mainly associated with a minor scandal involving Prince Charles) that I’d been given so I could toast Armstrong, Aldrin, and, as my mother usually described him, “poor Michael Collins.” We watched as the Eagle slowly (or so it seemed to me then) descended onto the gray surface that I believed would soon (the exciting-sounding year 2000 sounded about right) play host to moon bases and other treats; I listened to the clipped, sparse commentary of a BBC that had the sensitivity to let the descent — and the men from NASA — speak for themselves.

And it was the BBC that we watched. Despite perpetual parental muttering about its (undoubted) left-wing bias, the Stuttafords, like most British families in that era, tended to turn to the Beeb for coverage of anything really significant. July 20, 1969, showed why. ITV’s coverage revolved around hours upon hours of Frost/Moon or, more accurately, David Frost’s Moon Party, a broadcast that drove one guest, Ray Bradbury, to walk off in despair. It was not, grumbled Bradbury later, “a night for Sammy Davis Jr. or Engelbert Humperdinck.” Indeed it wasn’t.

Then finally (nearly 4 a.m., UK time — what had they been doing in there?), Neil Armstrong stepped out of the Eagle and onto the Moon. Sitting in a house in the quiet English countryside, we raised refreshed glasses and exhaustedly contemplated the spectacle of a man walking on a rock some quarter of a million miles away. The images transmitted from the Sea of Tranquility were blurry, shadowy, appropriately dreamlike, but what had taken place was clear, even if I didn’t remain awake long enough to see Aldrin join Armstrong out in that “magnificent desolation” of theirs. No matter. As my diary for that night records: “MAN on MOON.” And so he was. And so they were. And so we were.

There are, of course, those who say that the whole thing was both a waste of money and a blind alley. I don’t agree, but that’s a discussion for another time. For now, I’m waiting for Monday the 20th, and a chance to crack open the cherry brandy in a celebration of that extraordinary night of 40 years ago. Come to think of it, maybe not cherry brandy, but you get the point . . .